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ABSTRACT—When do judges follow rules expected to produce unjust 
results, and when do they intentionally misapply such rules to avoid 
injustice? Judicial rule-breaking is commonly observed when national 
dignity and morality are at stake, such as abolitionist judges charged with 
applying federal fugitive slave laws, or when lives hang in the balance, 
such as applications of criminal sentencing rules. Much less is understood 
about judicial rule-breaking in quotidian civil litigation, in spite of the 
sizeable impact on litigants and potential litigants, as well as the frequency 
with which judges face such decisions. This Article is the first to 
theoretically assess and empirically analyze judicial rule-breaking in the 
commonplace setting of applying two rules regarding sexual harassment. 
We find that the likelihood of rule-breaking increases when judges perceive 
that pleas to legislatively or judicially correct the rule that produces unfair 
results would go unanswered. 
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Judges are frequently charged with applying rules. Some rules are 
easier to follow than others. Sometimes, properly followed rules lead to 
unjust results. Some rules, especially judicially made rules derived from 
interpreting unique fact patterns of cases, are more likely to result in unfair 
or unjust outcomes when applied to more common fact patterns. There are 
no formal or moral guidelines for judges to follow when applying rules 
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perceived to lead to unjust results.1 What should a judge do when she 
expects that applying a straightforward but bad rule will result in an unjust 
outcome? A judge has two possible ways of dealing with such a situation. 
First, she may diligently follow the rule, allow the expected unjust 
outcome, and call attention to the problem in the hope of fixing the rule for 
future cases.2 This path presents a dilemma for the judge: the more unfair 
the outcome, the more likely the call to legislators will be answered; but the 
more unfair the outcome, the more the judge might want to avoid the 
responsibility or association with the result. Second, a judge may 
intentionally misapply the rule to achieve a more just outcome in the 
instant matter but risk appearing incapable of interpreting and following 
rules, and worse, increase the risk that the rule will go unfixed, with the 
knowledge that future applications will likely result in more injustices. The 
more straightforward and clear the rule is, the less flexibility the judge will 
have to get away with masquerading a misapplication as legitimate 
interpretation. 
Putting aside the important normative question of which route judges 
should take,3 this Article is concerned with addressing when judges are 
more likely to pick one route over the other when faced with a judicially 
constructed rule likely to result in unjust results when properly applied. We 
are particularly interested in instances of this choice being made when no 
lives hang in the balance and no matters of national security are being 
weighed. That is, we are interested in the choices judges make when they 
feel less political and social pressure to behave as expected. Under these 
circumstances, when do judges take the first path (follow the rule, drawing 
attention to the unjust result), and when do they take the second path 
(deviate from the rule to achieve a more just result, setting a bad precedent 
on rule interpretation and perhaps undermining the judge’s analytic 
credibility)? 
 
1 Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 615–16 (1999) (“[T]here is no 
solid ground—based on embedded understandings of rationality, or equitable treatment, or absurd 
results—on which rule appliers can stand to resist formal rule-like readings that might be thought to 
produce such outcomes. And even if this is the legal situation we face, we cannot find shared agreement 
that judges ought to interpret as if they could purposively reason from a coherent legal universe in 
which such concepts were intelligible.”). 
2 Of course, a judge could also follow the rule without calling attention to the injustice. Because of 
the low cost of including dicta in opinions and the likelihood that a failure to include such dicta given 
the injustice resulting from the judge’s opinion would tarnish the judge’s reputation, this course of 
action is not considered as viable as the other two described in more detail. In any event, exclusion of 
this option does not affect the authors’ argument or analysis. 
3 This issue is taken up directly elsewhere. See, e.g., JEFFREY BRAND-BALLARD, LIMITS OF 
LEGALITY: THE ETHICS OF LAWLESS JUDGING (2010); Paul Butler, When Judges Lie (and When They 
Should), 91 MINN. L. REV. 1785 (2007); Robert M. Cover, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1005–06 (1968) 
(reviewing RICHARD HILDRETH, ATROCIOUS JUDGES: LIVES OF JUDGES INFAMOUS AS TOOLS OF 
TYRANTS AND INSTRUMENTS OF OPPRESSION (1856)). 
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As distinguished from “standards,” which leave to the judge the ability 
to specify which conduct qualifies as permissible (for instance, using 
“reasonable care”), “rules” determine in advance the specific conduct 
qualifying as permissible, leaving only factual inquiry for the judge (for 
instance, care is reasonably taken when driving less than or equal to sixty-
five miles per hour).4 Rules may produce inefficient results (on average) 
because they do not sufficiently permit judges to reach sensible outcomes 
in individual cases.5 Judges want to fashion decisions that make sense 
given the relevant facts and policies; they want their opinions to feel right 
to them. Presumably, the American legal system harmonizes with the goal 
of reaching the “right” decision. This is the basis for the view among many 
commentators that the law abhors rules and prefers standards.6 Others have 
spent substantial energy articulating when rules are better than standards 
for reaching socially optimal results.7 This paper contributes to this robust 
discourse by focusing on what judges actually do when faced with a rule 
that likely produces unjust results—when a standard might have provided a 
better vehicle for administering legal commands. It also contributes to the 
discussion of rule-breaking by empirically analyzing what judges do when 
confronting this decision in cases unlikely to draw national attention or to 
affect judges’ political aspirations. 
 
4 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559–60 
(1992).  
5 Id.; see also Nathan Greenblatt, How Mandatory Are Mandatory Minimums? How Judges Can 
Avoid Imposing Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 37 (2008) (citing Alex Kozinski, 
The Real Issues of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1102 (2004)) (discussing the inefficient 
results from mandatory minimum rules); Dale A. Nance, Rules, Standards, and the Internal Point of 
View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1287, 1305 (2006) (“[I]t is generally understood that the use of standards 
might contribute to efficient allocations in certain situations.”); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in 
Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 600 (1988) (“[C]rystalline rules seem less the king of the 
efficiency mountain than we may normally assume.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 66 (1992) (“Rule-based decisionmaking suppresses 
relevant similarities and differences; standards allow decisionmakers to treat like cases that are 
substantively alike.”); cf. Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 49, 86 (2007) (“Predictability in antitrust is important, but it is not sufficient to justify 
rules even for a system concerned primarily with incentive effects.”). 
6 William L. Reynolds, Legal Process and Choice of Law, 56 MD. L. REV. 1371, 1399–400 (1997) 
(“The truth of the matter is that judges bitterly resist being bound by ‘rules’ that prevent them from 
reaching sensible results. . . . Thus, predictability, as a raw tool, will generally lose out to 
sensibleness.”); see also supra note 5. 
7 See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, The Law and Economics of Tort Law: The Profound Revolution, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 1047 (1989) (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987)); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Sharing 
Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors, 98 YALE L.J. 831 (1989); David Rosenberg, The Causal 
Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 
(1984). 
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In deciding which path to take, judges are likely to start from a 
position of preferring the first path (applying the rule correctly). This is 
because, ceteris paribus, judges feel charged with the task of following 
rules as they are set out, as distinguished from standards, which 
axiomatically permit more room for interpretation of facts and law to be 
molded to a preferable result.8 The job of a judge is to distinguish rules 
from standards and apply rules as written.9 We theorize that two conditions 
must exist for judges to follow the first path despite a known likelihood of 
an unjust outcome. First, judges must perceive that a plea for assistance 
from legislative or judicial bodies is sufficiently likely to be answered or at 
least seriously considered. As discussed in greater detail below, this is 
certainly not always the case. Judges vary significantly in how strongly 
they believe that pleas will be heeded. 
Second, the judge must perceive that the injustice produced by 
applying the rule perfectly will not be too severe. Determining how much 
injustice is too much is relatively easy when the injustice is either 
extremely great or extremely minimal. For instance, if the result were 
executing an innocent man, this would likely be too unjust to merit 
applying a bad rule to the facts of a case, even if it were certain to get the 
attention of legislators and compel them to amend the rule. If the unjust 
result were merely a financial burden easily shouldered by one of the 
parties, a judge might more readily tolerate applying a bad rule to the facts. 
The tougher cases are those where the injustice is significant, but not 
morally intolerable. For instance, what about sentencing someone to a 
prison term longer than one might think is appropriate for the offense? That 
is, evidence sufficiently supports the claim that a defendant committed a 
crime, but the rule requires a longer sentence than one might think is 
justified. This is precisely the situation for many judges faced with 
minimum sentencing rules that require harsh penalties relative to the crime 
committed.10 
 
8 Cover, supra note 3, at 1005 (“The federal judiciary, however, has remained faithful to its long 
tradition as executors of immoral law.”); Greenblatt, supra note 5, at 6–9; Kaplow, supra note 4, at 594. 
9 Emily Bazelon, Bench Pressed: When the Judge’s Hands Are Tied, SLATE (Nov. 23, 2004), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2004/11/bench_pressed.html [http://
perma.cc/72H5-P9U8] (describing Judge Cassell’s perception that the court had no choice but to 
sentence a man to life in prison for possessing a handgun in his home even though it is “unjust, cruel, 
and even irrational”). 
10 See, e.g., Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on 
the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1745–46 (1992) (discussing judges’ criticism of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines); Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1, 57–58 (2010) (noting that a trial court described the mandatory fifty-five-year prison term of a 
“young [twenty-four-year-old], first-time offender . . . convicted of dealing marijuana and . . . 
possessing a gun three times in connection with his marijuana dealing . . . as ‘cruel, unjust, and 
irrational’”); J.C. Oleson, The Antigone Dilemma: When the Paths of Law and Morality Diverge, 
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 669 (2007); Elizabeth A. Olson, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums After 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
114 
Perhaps the most famous example of this type of dilemma is when 
abolitionist judges were charged with applying fugitive slave laws 
requiring them to legally find that a human being was a possession of 
another human being in spite of the judges’ consciences.11 But there are 
more quotidian, modern examples in which less is at stake than the nation’s 
collective regard for human dignity and welfare, and judges still feel the 
tension of applying a clear rule that directly results in injustice localized to 
the parties. These examples are important because they present instances in 
which it is easier to isolate the factors that likely influence judges’ 
decisionmaking. 
For instance, even in the application of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA)12—a soporifically complex act but not one 
notoriously brimming with moral quandaries—judges may face the 
difficult decision of applying rules that produce unjust results. In Andrews-
Clarke v. Travelers Insurance Co.,13 Judge William G. Young was charged 
with applying a rule that was certain to produce the unpleasant result of 
denying a grieving widow relief against an insurance company. After 
reciting the facts of Diane Andrews-Clarke’s late husband’s battles with 
alcohol and mental instability, his multiple suicide attempts, and his being 
raped in a mental institution, Judge Young concluded: 
 Under traditional notions of justice, the harms alleged—if true—should 
entitle Diane Andrews-Clarke to some legal remedy on behalf of herself and 
her children against Travelers . . . . Consider just one of her claims—breach of 
contract. This cause of action—that contractual promises can be enforced in 
the courts—pre-dates [the] Magna Carta. It is the very bedrock of our notion 
of individual autonomy and property rights. It was among the first precepts of 
the common law to be recognized in the courts of the Commonwealth and has 
been zealously guarded by the state judiciary from that day to this. Our entire 
capitalist structure depends on it.14 
After essentially explaining that failing to give the plaintiff a remedy 
here would not only be woefully unjust, but also would fly in the face of 
bedrock notions of American jurisprudence and defy all that for which the 
American capitalist free market system stands, Judge Young found that the 
 
Apprendi, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 811, 840 (2002) (discussing how the lack of a judge’s sentencing 
discretion “underscores the substantial harm to the defendant’s liberty interest”); Andre M. Davis, 
Editorial, Mandatory Injustice: Federal Sentencing Rules Tie Judges’ Hands and Result in Unfairly 
Harsh Prison Terms, BALT. SUN, Dec. 9, 2011, at 25A. 
11 Donald M. Roper, In Quest of Judicial Objectivity: The Marshall Court and the Legitimation of 
Slavery, 21 STAN. L. REV. 532, 534–37 (1969) (discussing the Marshall Court’s grappling with moral 
and legal issues relating to the slave trade). 
12 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012). 
13 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997). 
14 Id. at 52–53 (footnotes omitted). 
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court had “no choice but to pluck Diane Andrews-Clarke’s case out of the 
state court in which she sought redress (and where relief to other litigants is 
available) and then, at the behest of Travelers . . . to slam the courthouse 
doors in her face and leave her without any remedy.”15 The court went on to 
describe this case as “yet another illustration of the glaring need for 
Congress to amend ERISA to account for the changing realities of the 
modern health care system.”16 
What makes the calculation of which path to take more challenging is 
the endogenous relationship between the severity of the perceived injustice 
and the likelihood that rote application of the rule will be regarded as 
needing legislative or judicial repair. Correctly applying a bad rule that 
requires a wealthy party to overpay a fine is less likely to garner the 
attention necessary to fix the rule than a judicial ruling correctly applying a 
federal law requiring federal officers to assist in the return of escaped 
slaves.17 As noted above, this makes it harder to predict which path judges 
will take because they might be more inclined to tolerate the resulting 
injustice if they believe that it will be remedied. Greater likelihood of 
injustice being remedied fuels judges’ abilities to rationalize their actions 
as “just doing their jobs,” both internally to reduce cognitive dissonance 
experienced from rendering a judgment at odds with their consciences,18 
and externally to protect the perceived legitimacy of the bench.19 
What happens when a judge realizes that a judicial or legislative “fix” 
is unlikely and applying the rule will lead to untenable results? When will 
the judge follow the rule and when will she circumvent it? To address these 
important questions one could compare cases at opposite ends of the 
spectrum. For instance, one could argue that judges are more likely to 
follow the rule if the penalty is a $50 fine and will not if the penalty is life 
in prison. But between these extremes, generalizations are harder to make 
 
15 Id. at 53. 
16 Id. (footnote omitted). 
17 This is a reference to the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850, which required federal officers 
to assist in the return of escaped slaves. Abolitionist judges applied the law and explained that this was 
what they were obligated to do even though they believed the result to be immoral. See Butler, supra 
note 3, at 1787–88. 
18 See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS (1975); LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); Ronald Dworkin, 
The Law of the Slave-Catchers, 1975 TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT 1437, 1437 (reviewing COVER, 
supra). 
19 Kathryn Abrams, Extraordinary Measures: Protesting Rule of Law Violations After Bush v. 
Gore, 21 LAW & PHIL. 165, 167–77 (2002) (synthesizing law professors’ collective response to Bush v. 
Gore as an illustration of a decision that so tears at the fabric of conscience that it might be regarded as 
problematic for the continued trust in the rule of law); Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1399, 1440 (2005) (“It is undoubtedly false that perceived injustice in the legal system leads to greater 
willingness to break the law for all people, in all circumstances, at all times.”). 
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because other factors—the area of law, the types of parties involved in the 
disputes, the result of applying the rule, and the judges’ perception that the 
rule would be fixed legislatively or judicially if the injustice were 
publicized—play a greater role in determining the path a judge will take. 
This is the primary aim of this Article: to identify a body of cases that 
controls each of these factors to the greatest possible extent, permitting 
isolated observation of the judicial decisionmaking process. Using doctrinal 
and empirical analysis, this Article examines the judicial reality of applying 
untenable rules in one cause of action, sexual harassment, to explain why 
judges applied the two rules in the past and predict how they will apply the 
rule in the future. 
This Article uses sexual harassment to accomplish this for three 
reasons. First, there are now three untenable rules in this legal area. 
Second, a judicial or legislative fix is likely not forthcoming. Third, 
discrimination claims make up close to 10% of the federal court docket, 
and 22% of all Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
charges from 2010 through 2013 involved harassment claims.20 Sexual 
harassment cases are thus theoretically fruitful, empirically available, and 
phenomenologically important. 
Vance v. Ball State University, a recent employment discrimination 
case, provides perhaps a uniquely well-serving proving grounds to test 
whether our hypothesis is true.21 There, the Supreme Court articulated a 
new rule regarding the definition of a supervisor for the purposes of 
determining the proper standard for employer liability for sexual 
harassment.22 The Court held, in applying its standard for liability for 
harassment by a supervisor, that an employer may be vicariously liable for 
a supervisor’s unlawful harassment only when the “employer has 
empowered that [supervisor] to take tangible employment actions against 
the victim, i.e., to effect a significant change in employment status, such as 
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different 
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”23 
This rule seems to belie a simple reality. To comply with an ever-
burgeoning array of employment laws, companies were already well 
advised to make their human resource departments the only authorized 
 
20 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in 
Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429 (2004); Charge Statistics: FY 1997 Through FY 
2013, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [http://perma.cc/9WAH-
UD7H]; Harassment Charges: FY 2010 – FY 2013, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
enforcement/harassment_new.cfm [http://perma.cc/X3PR-5DAN]. 
21 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). 
22 Id. at 2454. 
23 Id. at 2443 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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final decisionmakers in the firms.24 Will courts follow Vance’s rule or not? 
It will be interesting to see how courts will apply this new rule, given that if 
applied as written, a company could avoid liability for virtually all 
instances of workplace harassment by simply requiring HR approval for all 
tangible employment actions. 
To help predict how courts will apply the newly promulgated Vance 
rule, we examine how the courts reacted when, in 1998, the Supreme Court 
issued three decisions that yielded two similarly untenable rules. The first 
rule the Court established was that an employer may avoid agency-based 
liability for the actions of a manager who sexually harassed an employee of 
one gender if the harasser also sexually harassed an employee of the other 
gender.25 This type of harasser is sometimes referred to as an 
“equal-opportunity harasser,” and the defense applying this rule is known 
as the “equal-opportunity harassment defense.”26 The second rule the Court 
established was that an employer may avoid liability if the employee-
plaintiff behaves unreasonably, which often equates to failing to complain 
or report the alleged sexual harassment either in a timely fashion or at all.27 
The logical extension of this holding was that employers, no matter how 
much care they exercised to prevent harassment and no matter how well 
they responded to harassment complaints, were liable if the employee 
complained in a timely manner. 
As this Article demonstrates, whereas almost all judges dutifully 
applied the first rule, the vast majority of judges did not follow the second 
rule. Why do judges act so differently with these two rules arising out of 
the same cause of action? Both are simple rules and easy to apply to most 
facts underlying sexual harassment claims. They carry identical penalties. 
Both rules, as applied, lead to unjust results: The first rule tolerates 
 
24 Kelli F. Robinson, Comment, Constructive Discharge Is Not a Tangible Employment Action: 
The Impact of Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 581, 600 (2006) (“Another 
preventive measure that employers can take is to require approval from human resources or upper 
management for employment decisions like demotions, reductions in pay, or discharges. With this 
requirement, supervisors cannot take any adverse employment actions against employees without some 
oversight by management.”). 
25 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–82 (1998) (“The critical issue, 
Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or 
conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.”).  
26 Miguel Nieves, Comment, Joseph Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.: Redefining 
Workplace Sexual Harassment to Include Same-Sex Sexual Harassment and the Effect on Employers, 
34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 941, 957–60 (2000) (discussing the use of this term and defense); see also 
Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 720 (1997) 
(“Because [the equal opportunity harasser’s] omnidirectional conduct does not expose ‘members of one 
sex . . . to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are 
not exposed,’ at present, sexual harassment doctrine affords a safeharbor that shields these scoundrels 
from Title VII sexual harassment liability.” (footnote omitted)). 
27 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806–07 (1998). 
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harassment so long as both male and female victims are harmed; the second 
rule ties employers’ liability to whether the employee had the wherewithal 
to report so that liability has nothing to do with the employer’s actions. 
Both rules, as applied, create perverse incentives. The first rule teaches 
managers that one may get away with sexually harassing employees of one 
gender by equally harassing employees of the other. The second rule 
encourages employers to design their harassment reporting policies and 
practices to be good enough to meet the minimum standard of 
reasonableness but not so good that they encourage prompt reporting of 
harassment in all cases. 
One might be tempted to conclude that that judges simply favor 
employers. But while pro-employer bias may be a factor explaining courts’ 
adherence to Oncale but departure from Ellerth and Faragher, pro-
employer bias does not explain the particular way in which courts have 
modified Ellerth and Faragher. This Article proposes that courts’ behavior 
is better explained by considering the frequency of the two categories of 
cases requiring the rules’ applications, the likelihood of holdings properly 
applying the rules resulting in perverse incentives being actualized by 
society, and the effect of issuing abhorrent rulings on judges’ perceived 
values. 
In Part I, we provide a brief description of sexual harassment law, 
which lays the foundation for the Court’s three decisions in 1998. Part II 
presents these two untenable rules and explains why judges even somewhat 
familiar with legislative and judicial history in this area would not expect 
either rule to be modified judicially or legislatively. In Part III, using 
doctrinal analysis, we demonstrate that courts apply the untenable equal-
opportunity harasser rule with abhorrent results. In Part IV, we empirically 
demonstrate that lower court judges do not dutifully apply the second 
untenable rule—the Supreme Court’s employer liability rule. In Part V, we 
not only explain these divergent results by examining judicial motivation, 
but also we contend that given the fact that a fix is unlikely, the judiciary 
has created a body of law that is both impractical and unjust. We conclude 
by discussing the implications of these findings. We apply our findings to 
render a prediction about how lower courts will apply Vance, the latest 
Supreme Court decision affecting sexual harassment. 
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 
What follows is a brief overview of the development of the law of 
sexual harassment. As described below, the law has evolved over time 
towards the affirmative defense under study in this Article. In short, courts 
grappled with extending the “because of sex” language of the statute to 
situations of ongoing harassment. The two vectors of case law posing the 
most difficulty for courts are the issue of same-sex harassment and the 
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issue of the extent to which liability should extend to employers for the 
actions of its employees and supervisors. We discuss this historical 
development as a way of introducing and explicating the context for the 
rule-breaking problem at the heart of this Article. 
A. The Origins and Early History of Sexual Harassment Law 
A detailed discussion of the history and development of sexual 
harassment in the workplace exceeds this Article’s scope. It is important to 
note, however, that no federal statute prohibits or even addresses sexual 
harassment in the workplace. Moreover, scholars generally agree that when 
enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress did not 
contemplate that the statute’s prohibition against discrimination based on 
sex would create a cause of action for employees who were subjected to 
unwanted sexual advances without suffering any tangible loss.28 In fact, the 
origins of the legal prohibition against sexual harassment are generally 
attributed to Professor Catherine MacKinnon. 
In 1979, Catherine MacKinnon coined the term “sexual harassment” 
and thereby fueled the creation of a cause of action when she published the 
book Sexual Harassment of Working Women.29 MacKinnon defined sexual 
harassment in its broadest sense as the “unwanted imposition of sexual 
requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power.”30 The 
influence of her work on both courts and scholars was swift and profound.31 
In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
expanded its “Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex” under Title 
 
28 See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment, 83 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1151, 1166 (1995) (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of congressional intent 
embodied in Title VII’s protection against sexual harassment in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 
477 U.S. 57 (1986)); Michelle Angelone, Note, Same-Sex Harassment Claims Under Title VII: Quick v. 
Donaldson Co. Breathes New Life into the Post-Garcia State of the Law, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
61, 76–79 (1997) (discussing several courts’ interpretations of congressional intent underlying sexual 
discrimination). “Tangible losses” occur when there is a material change in employment, such as 
termination, failure to promote, demotion, or a significant change in benefits. See Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). 
29 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION (1979); see also Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 
83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998) (discussing Professor MacKinnon’s influential role in the 
development of sexual discrimination law).  
30 MACKINNON, supra note 29, at 1. See generally Louis P. DiLorenzo & Laura H. Harshbarger, 
Employer Liability for Supervisor Harassment After Ellerth and Faragher, 6 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 3 (1999) (exploring the Court’s holdings in Ellerth and Faragher and explaining the 
ramifications of these decisions from an employer’s perspective). 
31 See e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 
41 STAN. L. REV. 751 (1989) (reviewing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987) 
and discussing Professor MacKinnon’s profound influence on legal doctrine and practice). 
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VII to include sexual harassment.32 After the EEOC published its 
guidelines, courts routinely held that hostile environment sexual 
harassment did in fact create a cause of action.33 In 1986, the Court put to 
rest any lingering questions concerning the legal efficacy of MacKinnon’s 
hostile environment theory in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.34 
In its relatively short opinion, the Meritor Court: (1) established sexual 
harassment as a violation of Title VII; (2) held that there are two types of 
harassment: quid pro quo (this for that) and hostile environment; (3) held 
that the conduct had to be because of sex; and (4) provided a basis for 
employer liability, instructing courts to look to agency principles.35 In the 
1998 Oncale, Ellerth, and Faragher opinions, the Court was forced to 
revisit the terms “because of sex,” “quid pro quo,” “hostile environment,” 
and “associated agency principles.”36 The resulting holdings created the 
untenable rules that are the subject of this Article. 
B. Same-Sex Sexual Harassment and the “Because of Sex” Problem 
When MacKinnon wrote that sexual harassment violated Title VII, she 
was focusing exclusively on male supervisors harassing subordinate 
women.37 The early line of cases, including Meritor, followed that 
paradigm.38 For a time, cases could be classified as falling into two 
 
32 The EEOC Guidelines defined quid pro quo harassment as: 
[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of 
a sexual nature . . . when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a 
term or condition of an individual’s employment, [or] (2) submission to or rejection of such 
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such 
individual . . . . 
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980). That text has remained the same to present day. See 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1604.11(a) (2013). 
33 See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Sexual harassment 
which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary 
barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a 
requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being 
allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial 
epithets.”); see also Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254–55 (4th Cir. 1983) (identifying two varieties of 
sexual harassment); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942–43 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Zabkowicz v. W. Bend 
Co., 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984). 
34 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see also Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
35 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66–72. 
36 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 749–66 (1998) (revisiting “quid pro quo”); 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790–92 (1998) (same); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998) (revisiting “because of sex”); see Eugene Scalia, The Strange 
Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 307 (1998) (discussing 
Oncale, Ellerth, and Faragher); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 
1683 (1998) (same); Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003) (same). 
37 MACKINNON, supra note 29. 
38 Susan Silberman Blasi, The Adjudication of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title 
VII, 12 LAB. LAW. 291, 292 (1996). 
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categories: sexual conduct and nonsexual conduct. In sexual conduct cases, 
the analysis was somewhat simple: if the conduct was either severe or 
pervasive and the conduct was sexual in nature, the courts presumed that 
the conduct was “because of sex” and found it unlawful.39 If the conduct 
was not sexual in nature, then the court needed to determine motivation. If 
the employer was motivated by sex (meaning gender) the employee had a 
case for “gender harassment”; if gender was not the motivation, there was 
no cause of action.40 Indeed, the “equal-opportunity jerk” became the 
tongue-in-cheek explanation for finding that a supervisor who created a 
hostile environment for employees regardless of sex (or any other protected 
class) did not violate the law.41 Post-Meritor courts eventually were 
confronted with male plaintiffs alleging hostile environment harassment by 
female supervisors.42 Courts upheld the cause of action.43 
In the mid-1990s, courts were faced with an onslaught of “same-sex” 
sexual harassment cases (i.e., a man harassing a man or a woman harassing 
a woman). Between 1992 and 1997, at least four different appellate courts 
faced the question of whether plaintiffs could make out a cause of action in 
same-sex cases.44 The circuits produced four different legal standards, 
 
39 In fact, as the law developed, cases arose in which female employees were considered to have 
suffered harassment if they were exposed to sexual conduct (e.g., conversations or pornographic 
pictures) that was not directed at them but was so pervasive that the complaining employee could not 
escape. See, e.g., Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen working outdoors, 
Petrosino would constantly confront crude sexual graffiti scrawled by co-workers inside terminal 
boxes.”). 
40 See Cline v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 923, 931 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (“For 
lack of a better term, and to distinguish this type of harassment from harassment which is sexual in 
nature (which the courts call ‘sexual harassment’) this court in Cline I referred to the type of harassment 
in issue here as ‘gender’ harassment.”). 
41 See, e.g., Toni J. Jaramilla, Key Strategies in Wrongful Discharge Litigation, in WRONGFUL 
DISCHARGE LITIGATION STRATEGIES 45 (2013), available at 2013 WL 5290493; Natasha L. Wilson & 
Keshia A. McCrary, Stop the Violence: Preventing and Protecting Against Workplace Bullying and 
Violence, FOR THE DEF., Jan. 2014, at 32. 
42 E.g., Egli v. Stevens, No. Civ. A. 93-157, 1993 WL 153141, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 1993) 
(“Plaintiff Christopher Egli alleges that he was on the Tredyffrin Library ‘fast track’ when, after six 
years of exemplary service, his female supervisors derailed his career in retaliation for his continual 
thwarting of their romantic overtures.”), aff’d, 17 F.3d 1429 (3d Cir. 1994); Showalter v. Allison Reed 
Grp., Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1205 (D.R.I. 1991); cf. Carter v. Caring for Homeless of Peekskill, Inc., 821 F. 
Supp. 225, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (acknowledging that the same cause of action is available for both  
male and female victims of harassment by applying the same standard but ultimately finding that the 
evidence was insufficient to support male employee’s claim of hostile environment). 
43 Carter, 821 F. Supp. at 230; cf. Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 861 n.15 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (explaining in dicta that while quid pro quo claims were available to male plaintiffs against 
their female supervisors, it would require a higher standard of proof to sustain a male plaintiff’s claim 
of hostile environment sexual harassment against a female supervisor). 
44 Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998); 
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996); Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 
1372 (8th Cir. 1996); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 
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prompting the Supreme Court to address the issue in Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Services.45 Before examining Oncale, an analysis of four of the 
circuit court opinions that led to the decision is warranted. 
The Fourth Circuit held that a same-sex sexual harassment claim 
would lie under Title VII if the harasser were gay. In Wrightson v. Pizza 
Hut of America, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that his supervisor graphically 
described homosexual sex to Wrightson and pressured him to have sex.46 
The supervisor also allegedly rubbed his genital area against Wrightson’s 
buttocks and often groped him.47 In finding for Wrightson, the Fourth 
Circuit held that same-sex Title VII claims are actionable only when the 
alleged harasser is homosexual and therefore presumably motivated by 
sexual desire.48 
The Eighth Circuit held that there was a same-sex sexual harassment 
cause of action if only one sex suffered the alleged conduct. In Quick v. 
Donaldson Co., the employees engaged in an activity they described as 
“bagging.”49 Bagging consisted of one employee hitting and grabbing 
another employee in the genital area.50 The plaintiff alleged that at least 
twelve different male coworkers bagged him.51 There was no evidence that 
female employees were ever bagged.52 The Eighth Circuit found for the 
plaintiff, reasoning that plaintiffs could maintain a claim for same-sex 
sexual harassment so long as employees of only one gender suffered the 
alleged conduct.53 If, however, there was no disparate treatment (i.e., both 
men and women were treated similarly, even if poorly) then there was no 
cause of action.54 
The Seventh Circuit held that an employee could maintain a claim of 
same-sex sexual harassment if the employee was treated poorly for failing 
to live up to a sexual stereotype. In Doe v. City of Belleville, two brothers, 
“J.” and “H.” (the Does), alleged that they were physically threatened and 
verbally harassed at the construction site where they worked.55 J. was called 
 
523 U.S. 75 (1998); McWilliams v. Fairfax Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996), 
abrogated by Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75.  
45 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
46 99 F.3d at 139. 
47 Id. at 140. 
48 Id. at 143. 
49 90 F.3d at 1378–79. 
50 Id. at 1374. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 1379. 
54 See id. 
55 119 F.3d 563, 566 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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“fat boy” by his coworkers, ostensibly because he was overweight.56 The 
employees, including a supervisor, referred to H., who was described as 
being effeminate, as “fag” and “queer” on a daily basis.57 One employee, 
described by the court as a former marine of imposing stature, called H. his 
“bitch” and threatened to take H. “out to the woods” and “get [him] up the 
ass.”58 The threats became physical when the former marine grabbed H. by 
his testicles and announced: “Well, I guess he is a guy.”59 Fearing 
escalation into outright physical assaults, the brothers quit their jobs.60 The 
Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that the sexual orientation of the 
harasser was relevant and instead focused on the conduct the plaintiffs were 
forced to endure.61 The court stated that conduct with sexual overtures is 
“because of sex” and thus, if severe and pervasive, is unlawful.62 
While the court’s language in Belleville appears to have been broad, its 
true holding was narrower. The court relied on Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins63 to justify finding for the plaintiffs. In Price Waterhouse, the 
Supreme Court held that an employer violates Title VII when an employee 
is denied a term or condition of employment because his or her appearance 
or conduct does not conform to stereotypical gender roles.64 Like the 
plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, H. was harassed because he did not conform 
to his coworkers’ stereotypical assessment of manliness. Accordingly, the 
 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 566–67. 
58 Id. at 567 (alteration in original). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 586 (“The focus on the sexual orientation of the harasser betrays a fundamental 
misconception that sexual harassment inevitably is a matter of sexual desire run amok . . . .”). 
62 See id. at 576–80; see also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3 (3d Cir. 
1990) (“The intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving sexual propositions, innuendo, 
pornographic materials, or sexual derogatory language is implicit, and thus should be recognized as a 
matter of course.”). 
63 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
64 Id. at 250. Hopkins was a senior manager at Price Waterhouse, a professional accounting 
partnership. After she was neither offered nor denied partnership and the partners refused to reconsider 
her for partnership, she sued Price Waterhouse, charging that it had discriminated against her on the 
basis of sex. The trial court ruled in Hopkins’s favor, holding that Price Waterhouse had unlawfully 
discriminated against her on the basis of sex by consciously giving credence to some partners’ 
comments about her that resulted from sex stereotyping. Both the trial court and the court of appeals 
held that an employer who has allowed a discriminatory motive to play a part in an employment 
decision must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same decision in the 
absence of discrimination, and that Price Waterhouse could not carry this burden. The Supreme Court 
issued four fractured opinions, but five justices agreed that the proper evidentiary standard was not clear 
and convincing evidence, but preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 231–32. 
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Seventh Circuit’s holding can be viewed merely as an application of Price 
Waterhouse.65 
Finally, the clearest but probably most troublesome opinion holding 
that same-sex claims are never actionable under Title VII originated in the 
Fifth Circuit. In Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, a male plaintiff 
alleged that on several occasions his male supervisor approached him from 
behind, grabbed him, and made sexual motions.66 Garcia complained, and 
his employer informed the supervisor that any further incidents would 
result in termination.67 After the supervisor was reprimanded, no further 
incidents occurred between Garcia and his supervisor.68 Shortly thereafter, 
Garcia filed a charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC, 
alleging that he had been sexually harassed in violation of Title VII.69 The 
Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant for four 
reasons. First, the harm was not redressable because the damages 
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 would not retroactively apply to 
the conduct, and equitable relief would be moot because Garcia still had his 
job.70 Second, the plaintiff failed to prove that any defendant was his 
“employer” for the purpose of applying Title VII.71 Third, even if one of the 
defendants could be construed as his employer, that defendant took prompt 
remedial action calculated to end the harassment and could thus avoid 
liability.72 Finally, the court flatly stated, “[H]arassment by a male 
supervisor against a male subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII 
even though the harassment has sexual overtones.”73 
Two years later, the Fifth Circuit once again faced a same-sex sexual 
harassment case in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.74 This 
time, the plaintiff’s case did not feature the defects that formed the basis for 
the somewhat unusual holding in Garcia; the requested relief was 
available, the plaintiff named the proper employer, and the employer did 
not respond to the plaintiff’s formal complaints.75 Moreover, the conduct 
 
65 See Ilona M. Turner, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 CALIF. 
L. REV. 561, 561–62 (2007) (identifying when and how courts have used the Price Waterhouse opinion 
to advance legal rights for transgendered Americans who may not live up to stereotypical gender norms 
for dress or behavior); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at 
Work, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 757, 764 (2013). 
66 28 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1994).  
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 449. 
70 Id. at 450. 
71 Id. at 450–51. 
72 Id. at 451. 
73 Id. at 451–52. 
74 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
75 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77. 
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was so severe and so pervasive that it withstood summary judgment,76 
forcing the court to reach the issue of whether same-sex sexual harassment 
would support a claim under Title VII directly. Bound by the decision in 
Garcia, the Oncale court dismissed the case but was troubled enough by its 
precedent to send up a flare: 
 This panel, however, cannot review the merits of Appellant’s Title VII 
argument on a clean slate. We are bound by our decision in Garcia . . . and 
must therefore affirm the district court. Although our analysis in Garcia has 
been rejected by various district courts, we cannot overrule a prior panel’s 
decision. In this Circuit, one panel may not overrule the decision, right or 
wrong, of a prior panel in the absence of an intervening contrary or 
superseding decision by the Court en banc or the Supreme Court.77 
As we will discuss in Part II, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the 
case78 and proceeded to create the first of our two bad rules. 
 
 * * * 
 
The problem of determining when an employer should be held 
vicariously liable for sexual harassment committed by its employees arose 
directly out of the Meritor Court’s failure to clearly define quid pro quo, 
hostile environment, and agency principles.79 Without clear guidance, the 
lower courts were forced to define each of these terms themselves. At first 
glance, it would seem that the definitions of quid pro quo and hostile 
environment would be relevant only to deciding whether sexual harassment 
existed, whereas agency principles alone would guide liability. But until 
the Supreme Court intervened in 1998, the courts regularly comingled these 
concepts in determining employer liability for sexual harassment. Below, 
we examine the early cases that grappled with this issue and the lead-up to 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher, and the aftermath 
of the decisions. 
 
76 Oncale’s coworkers, including supervisory personnel, restrained him, unzipped their trousers and 
placed their genitals on his neck and arm, and threatened to rape him. Oncale claimed he was in a 
shower at work when these same men got in the shower with him, restrained him, and sexually 
assaulted him using a bar of soap. Oncale, 83 F.3d at 118–19. 
77 Id. at 119 (footnote omitted). 
78 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 520 U.S. 1263 (1997) (granting certiorari). 
79 See, e.g., Katherine Philippakis, Comment, When Employers Should Be Liable for Supervisory 
Personnel: Applying Agency Principles to Hostile-Environment Sexual Harassment Cases, 28 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 1275, 1275 (1996) (illustrating the ambiguity brought on by the Court’s failure to precisely define 
“agency principles” by pointing out the confusion among lower courts). 
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C. Determining Employer Liability: What Preceded  
Ellerth and Faragher 
After Meritor, lower courts were required to look to agency principles 
in order to determine employer liability.80 By 1998, there was general 
agreement between the circuits on some liability issues and a split between 
the circuits with regard to others. The circuits agreed that employers were 
always liable for quid pro quo harassment but could avoid liability for 
hostile environment cases.81 The theory behind this distinction was that in 
quid pro quo cases, a supervisor truly acted as an agent of the company 
because the threatened actions (for example, hiring, firing, promoting, or 
demoting) were company actions that could only be accomplished in the 
course of employment with the express or implied consent of the 
employer.82 In contrast, a hostile environment could be created without any 
use of authority delegated by the company. The supervisor could, for 
instance, make comments and touch employees without engaging in an 
official company action. This is why all circuits agreed that employers 
were liable for quid pro quo harassment but not always for the existence of 
a hostile environment.83 
With regard to hostile environment, a split between two theories 
emerged. The minority of courts applied quid pro quo reasoning and held 
that if a supervisor acted within the “scope of employment” to create a 
hostile environment then the company would be held liable.84 As an 
example, a company would be liable for the actions of a supervisor who 
used the power of the job to call a daily meeting with a subordinate during 
which the supervisor commented on the subordinate’s body, touched the 
subordinate employee inappropriately, or required the employee to watch 
pornography. Conversely, the majority of circuits employed the so-called 
 
80 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). 
81 See, e.g., Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 493–94 (7th Cir. 1997) (requiring 
negligence to hold employer vicariously liable for hostile work environment); Davis v. City of Sioux 
City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1367–68 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that employers are vicariously liable for quid pro 
quo harassment); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 513–14 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that employers are 
vicariously liable for quid pro quo harassment); Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106–07 
(3d Cir. 1994) (finding that employers are vicariously liable for quid pro quo harassment, but requiring 
use of actual authority to hold employer vicariously liable for hostile work environment); Karibian v. 
Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that employers are vicariously liable for quid 
pro quo harassment); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir. 1993) (same); Kauffman 
v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 185–86 (6th Cir. 1992) (same); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, 
Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989) (same). 
82 Karibian, 14 F.3d at 777 (“Because the quid pro quo harasser, by definition, wields the 
employer’s authority to alter the terms and conditions of employment—either actually or apparently—
the law imposes strict liability on the employer for quid pro quo harassment.”). 
83 See, e.g., Jansen, 123 F.3d at 501–03. 
84 See, e.g., Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 183.  
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negligence standard.85 Under the negligence standard, the employer was 
liable if it knew or should have known about the alleged harassment.86 
Thus, in the example above, the employer would not be liable if it had a 
policy against sexual harassment informing employees to complain and an 
affected employee did not do so. 
As expected, this encouraged plaintiffs’ lawyers to label their cases as 
quid pro quo as opposed to hostile environment.87 That the labels were both 
unclear and overlapping likely contributed to the substantial increase in 
sexual harassment litigation throughout the 1990s.88 The differences 
between the theories are substantial at their extremes but not at the margin. 
For example, a supervisor who instructs an employee, “sleep with me or 
you are fired,” and then fires the employee who does not acquiesce has 
clearly engaged in quid pro quo harassment. The issue is not so clear, 
however, when (1) the employee refuses to sleep with the supervisor and 
does not get fired; (2) the employee sleeps with the supervisor and does not 
get fired; (3) the employee quits and the supervisor later claims the 
purported threat was a joke; or (4) the threat is not as clear (e.g., “things 
would go better for you here if you wore more provocative clothes and 
were a little more accommodating”), and the employee quits, acquiesces, or 
ignores the supervisor but is not disciplined. Are any, or all, of the 
scenarios listed above quid pro quo? Are any, or all, of the scenarios hostile 
environment? The answer from the case law is confusing. There are cases 
in which each of these scenarios has been labeled quid pro quo, hostile 
environment, both, and neither.89 As this Article contends, the diverse 
opinions are the product of results-oriented adjudication in the lower courts 
that led to a spilt in the circuits and, in this case, to the Supreme Court 
addressing the issue. 
 
85 See, e.g., Jansen, 123 F.3d at 493–94. 
86 Philippakis, supra note 79, at 1282–83. 
87 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753 (1998). 
88 Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 
548, 551 & n.7 (2001).  
89 Compare Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1181 (9th Cir. 2003) (classifying an 
implied threat as a hostile work environment), and Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(suggesting that an implied demand for sex could be considered hostile work environment), with 
Quantock v. Shared Mktg. Servs., Inc., 312 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that a supervisor’s 
direct requests for sex were sufficient to alter the terms of an employee’s employment, and also that 
those threats potentially created a hostile work environment), and Jansen, 123 F.3d at 512 (7th Cir. 
1997) (Posner, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that cases in which an employer “fires her, or 
denies her a promotion, or blocks a scheduled raise, or demotes her, or transfers her to a less desirable 
job location, or refuses to give her the training that the company’s rules entitle her to receive” constitute 
quid pro quo and not hostile work environment claims), and Estes v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 05 
C 5750, 2007 WL 551554, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2007) (defining hostile work environment cases as 
ones in which no tangible action was taken). 
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II. THE TWO RULES 
A. Oncale Creates the First Bad Rule 
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, the U.S. Supreme Court 
resolved the split among the circuits by deciding that a plaintiff could make 
out a claim for sexual harassment as long as the harassing conduct was 
“because of sex.”90 The immediate reaction to the ruling was one of 
celebration by the plaintiffs’ bar, which collectively regarded the holding as 
a victory for workers, especially for homosexuals in the workplace.91 
Indeed, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) hailed Oncale as an 
important breakthrough “for all Americans, gay or straight, male or 
female.”92 The ACLU, however, missed the point. 
The key holding in Oncale is that the conduct in question must be 
“because of sex.”93 Because of sex, however, does not mean that the 
conduct is sexual in nature. Making conduct of a sexual nature per se 
unlawful would, according to the Court, create a general civility code for 
the American workplace and would ignore the differences in the ways men 
and women routinely interact with members of the same and opposite sex.94 
According to the Court: 
The prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality 
nor androgyny in the workplace; it forbids only behavior so objectively 
offensive as to alter the “conditions” of the victim’s employment. “Conduct 
that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or 
abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person would 
find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview.”95 
In other words, in an effort to avoid “transform[ing] Title VII into a 
general civility code,”96 the Court imposed both the “because of sex” and 
“severe or pervasive” requirements, and removed the requirement that the 
conduct be sexual in nature. The resulting doctrine, however, provides 
incomplete protection to workers: what if conduct is sexual in nature and is 
either severe or pervasive, but is not “because of sex”? The Court stated 
 
90 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
91 Jennifer J. Ator, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment After Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 
Inc.: Overcoming the History of Judicial Discrimination in Light of the “Common Sense” Standard, 
6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 583, 586 (1998) (challenging the “lower courts to step away from their 
previous discriminatory treatment of homosexuals to create a body of law that consistently finds 
liability based on harassment ‘because of sex’”); Kathy Peck & Lisa Freiley, New Developments in 
Sexual Harassment Case Law, 15 LERC MONOGRAPH SERIES 77, 90 (1998).  
92 Jan Crawford Greenburg, Sex Suit Fallout Alarms Its Advocates, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 1999, at A1. 
93 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). 
96 Id. at 80. 
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that the issue in this situation is “whether members of one sex are exposed 
to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members 
of the other sex are not exposed.”97 To emphasize this point, the Court 
stated that a man could prove same-sex harassment if men were subjected 
to some form of harassing conduct and women were not.98 However, the 
obvious logical extension of this argument is that if women were subjected 
to the same conduct as men then there is no actionable harassment for 
either the men or the women. Thus, the Oncale rule created a perfect test 
case for a rule that could result in an unjust result—a harasser escaping 
liability because he or she harasses victims of both genders.99 This situation 
highlights the question raised in this Article: Would judges apply the rule 
as established by the Court, or would they find a way around the rule and 
thus create new law? As described below, courts followed the rule. 
B. The Equal-Opportunity Harasser Defense 
In Holman v. Indiana, a husband and wife alleged that the same 
supervisor sexually harassed each of them.100 The wife alleged that the male 
supervisor sexually harassed her by touching her body, standing too close 
to her, asking her to go to bed with him, making sexual comments, and 
otherwise creating a hostile work environment.101 In addition, as a result of 
her refusal to perform the acts requested, the supervisor negatively altered 
her job performance evaluations and otherwise retaliated against her for 
protesting his harassing behavior.102 The Holmans’ complaint further 
alleged that the supervisor harassed the husband by “grabbing his head 
while asking for sexual favors.”103 When the husband refused such requests, 
the supervisor retaliated by opening the husband’s locker and throwing 
away his belongings.104 
The court dismissed the case based on the equal-opportunity harasser 
defense.105 To support its decision, the court stated that “the ‘equal-
opportunity harasser’ does not treat plaintiffs differently than members of 
 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 80–81. 
99 See generally Steven S. Locke, The Equal Opportunity Harasser as a Paradigm for Recognizing 
Sexual Harassment of Homosexuals Under Title VII, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 383, 406–08 (1996); David S. 
Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex?: The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1697, 1739–42 (2002) (discussing the equal-opportunity harasser defense and its 
applications). 





105 Id. at 916. 
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the opposite sex . . . . [And] under current sex discrimination theories, there 
is no discrimination when something happens to both sexes and not simply 
to one.”106 The court concluded by stating: “Simply put . . . under current 
Title VII jurisprudence, conduct occurring equally to members of both 
genders cannot be discrimination ‘because of sex’” and is therefore not 
unlawful.107 
Similarly, in Landrau Romero v. Caribbean Restaurants, Inc., the 
court dismissed the plaintiff’s sexual harassment case because the 
supervisor exhibited the same harassing conduct to both men and women.108 
The plaintiff, a man, alleged that his supervisor made an explicitly sexual 
comment to him, and the supervisor then repeated the comment to a female 
employee shortly thereafter.109 Like in Holman, the Landrau Romero court 
dismissed the case pursuant to the equal-opportunity harasser defense.110 To 
support its decision the court stated: “[T]he record clearly shows that [the 
supervisor] did not reserve his tasteless comportment for male employees, 
or that he treated male employees differently from female employees. In 
fact, it appears that [the supervisor] directed his most outlandish behavior, 
grabbing his genitals, as an insult to female employees.”111 The court 
concluded: “While [the supervisor]’s behavior and comments were often 
sexual in nature, and may have created an undignified or even unpleasant 
working environment, they were not discriminatory and thus not actionable 
under Title VII.”112 In fact, according to Landrau Romero, the equal-
opportunity harasser defense defeats both quid pro quo and hostile 
environment cases.113 
If two principal functions of judicial decisions are to allocate justice to 
the parties and to impose rules that incentivize good behavior,114 the equal-
opportunity harasser defense undermines both. The Holmans, for example, 
suffered tremendous injustice. Ms. Holman, Mr. Holman, and Mr. Landrau 
Romero all experienced the same type of conduct as any sexual harassment 
claimant. Yet they all were denied redress under Title VII solely because 
they were harassed by someone who harassed members of both genders—a 
 
106 Id. at 912. 
107 Id. at 916. 
108 14 F. Supp. 2d 185, 190 (D.P.R. 1998). 
109 Id. at 187. 




114 See Jeffrey Evans Stake, Status and Inventive Aspects of Judicial Decisions, 79 GEO. L.J. 1447, 
1450–62 (1991) (discussing the incentive and status effects of judicial opinions); see generally Barry 
Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257 (2005) (providing an overview of 
various positive and normative scholarship concerning motivations of judicial decisionmaking). 
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fact that in no way reduces the degree of harm they suffered. The courts in 
Holman and Landrau Romero accurately applied Oncale, but doing so 
deprived the plaintiffs of justice. 
Moreover, this rule creates incentives that are downright bizarre: 
managers learn that they have carte blanche to sexually harass employees 
so long as they conduct themselves the same way with both sexes. Despite 
these abhorrent results, courts follow this rule even when there is a way to 
justify ignoring the rule. In Oncale, the defense was neither raised nor 
discussed.115 Judges could, therefore, cite that distinction as a basis for 
refusing to validate the defense. But judges do not do this and instead 
uniformly follow this rule. Conversely, when it comes to employer liability 
in sexual harassment cases, the vast majority of courts ignore the clear rule 
in order to provide justice to employers and to prevent perverse incentives 
from prevailing. Before we explain why this is the case, we need to 
demonstrate that courts do in fact ignore the vicarious liability rule. 
C. Ellerth and Faragher Create the Second Bad Rule 
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the question before the court 
was: 
Whether a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment may be stated under Title 
VII . . . where the plaintiff employee has neither submitted to the sexual 
advances of the alleged harasser nor suffered any tangible effects on the 
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment as a 
consequence of a refusal to submit to those advances?116 
The Court addressed the quid pro quo–hostile environment distinction 
but not in the way the parties had hoped. First, the Court seemingly defined 
quid pro quo, stating: “Cases based on threats which are carried out are 
referred to often as quid pro quo cases, as distinct from bothersome 
attentions or sexual remarks that are sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
create a hostile work environment.”117 Arguably, then, the Court’s view was 
that to be quid pro quo harassment the threat must be carried out.118 
 
115 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
116 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (No. 
97-569), 1997 WL 33485655, at *i. 
117 Ellerth, 524 U.S at 751.  
118 Id. We say arguably because the contrast that the Court used (“as distinct from bothersome 
attentions or sexual remarks that are sufficiently severe or pervasive”) is a false dichotomy. Id. The 
former has never been considered unlawful harassment, and the latter is about as clear a definition of 
hostile environment as we have. The true dichotomy would be: Cases based on threats which are carried 
out are referred to often as quid pro quo cases as opposed to cases in which an employee is not 
disciplined after either: (1) acquiescing to or (2) rejecting a supervisor’s advances. Despite the Court’s 
lack of clarity, one could argue that Ellerth stands for the proposition that in order for there to be quid 
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After acknowledging the quid pro quo–hostile environment 
distinction, the Court rejected the theory that this distinction was 
determinative of employer liability.119 Instead, the Court held that the key 
issue was whether the employee suffered a tangible loss.120 If so, the 
employer would be strictly liable.121 If not, the employer could still be 
liable but might escape liability if it could prove an affirmative defense.122 
How does this rule square with the quid pro quo–hostile environment 
dichotomy? A fortiori all quid pro quo cases impose strict vicarious 
liability on employers because they, by the Court’s definition, necessarily 
involve a carried-out threat (i.e., a tangible loss). Hostile environment cases 
can go either way—they can result in an employee suffering a tangible loss, 
resulting in strict employer liability; or they can involve no tangible loss at 
all, resulting in employer liability subject to an affirmative defense. 
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,123 the plaintiff, a lifeguard, alleged 
that she was sexually harassed by her supervisor, Terry. The district court 
found that the conduct was unlawful harassment and that the City was 
liable.124 After an appeal125 and en banc126 rulings reversing the lower court, 
the Supreme Court heard the case as a companion case with Ellerth. Like in 
Ellerth, the Court established and applied the new standard for sexual 
harassment liability: Employers are liable for supervisor’s harassment if 
employees suffer a tangible loss.127 If there is no tangible loss, employers 
can avoid liability only if they can satisfy the two-prong affirmative 
defense: (1) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) that the plaintiff 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to otherwise avoid harm.128 
Unlike in Ellerth, the Court did not remand the case because while the City 
of Boca Raton had a sexual harassment policy, it did not distribute it to 
employees and lower level supervisors. Thus, the Court held, as a matter of 
law, the City of Boca Raton did not exercise reasonable care to prevent 
 
pro quo harassment the employee must suffer the discipline threatened. If this is the case, then all cases 
in which no discipline is taken would constitute hostile environment cases. 
119 Id. at 754. 
120 Id. at 764–65. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 765. 
123 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
124 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552, 1562, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1994).  
125 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 76 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 1996). 
126 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 
127 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764–65. 
128 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
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harassment, and thus, it was liable for Terry’s actions against the 
Plaintiff.129 
D. The Two-Prong Ellerth–Faragher Defense 
The so-called Ellerth–Faragher defense has two prongs: (1) “that the 
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior” (the “Reasonable Employer Prong”), and (2) 
“that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid 
harm otherwise” (the “Unreasonable Employee Prong”).130 Upon any fair 
reading of this language, employers cannot avoid liability simply by 
proving that they acted reasonably or even with the utmost care.131 They 
must also prove that the employee was unreasonable in some way.132 A 
fortiori, if an employee behaves properly—that is, reports harassment and 
accepts the employer’s reasonable corrective action—the defendant should 
never be able to establish the Unreasonable Employee Prong, and will 
therefore always be vicariously liable.133 This is exactly what Justice 
Thomas argued in his dissenting opinions.134 But when we studied the first 
seventy-two summary judgment cases decided under the defense, a decade 
ago, this proved not to be the case.135 Instead, our study of district court 
decisions revealed that courts routinely permitted well-behaved employers 
to avoid liability even when employees behaved entirely reasonably by any 
measure.136 
The new study we present in this Article examines appeals of 
summary judgment motions. The main advantage of such cases is the de 
novo standard of appellate review for summary judgment determinations.137 
Because appellate courts give no deference to lower courts’ rulings under 
the de novo standard of review, merits determinations come from the 
circuit courts themselves rather than the lower courts.138 To prevail on 
summary judgment, the moving party must show “that there is no genuine 
 
129 Id. at 808. 
130 Id. at 807; accord Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
131 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 773 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
132 Id. at 765 (majority opinion). 
133 See id. 
134 See id. at 771–74 (Thomas, J., dissenting); accord Faragher, 524 U.S. at 810–11 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
135 David Sherwyn, Michael Heise & Zev J. Eigen, Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel Your 
“1-800” Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the 
Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1283–88 (2001). 
136 See id. 
137 See, e.g., Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 743 (2d Cir. 2003). 
138 EDWARD BRUNET, JOHN PARRY & MARTIN REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW & 
PRACTICE § 11.1 (2014). 
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issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.”139 If a plaintiff employee sufficiently disputes 
the facts on either prong, a court may not grant summary judgment.140 Two 
observations bear noting here: First, of the 131 cases examined in this 
study, all but one originated with an employer’s motion for summary 
judgment. The plaintiff was the movant in only one case; that plaintiff was 
pro se, and the defendant cross-moved and prevailed both at the lower court 
and on appeal.141 Second, all 131 cases involved a plaintiff appealing a pro-
defendant grant of summary judgment in the lower court. This makes sense 
since denials of summary judgment motions are not immediately 
appealable,142 and although a summary judgment denial theoretically 
merges with a court’s final order after trial, most jurisdictions do not permit 
appeal of that portion of the order.143 
III. PRIOR RESEARCH ON THE ELLERTH–FARAGHER DEFENSE 
As noted above, our previous study examined all federal district and 
circuit court cases deciding summary judgment motions on the merits of 
the Ellerth–Faragher defense in the eighteen months following the 
Supreme Court’s issuance of the companion opinions.144 For each case, we 
modeled success on the affirmative defense (and success on each prong of 
the defense) as a function of employer behavior and employee behavior. In 
particular, we looked at whether the employer had a “good” anti-
harassment policy in place, whether the employer responded sufficiently to 
the reported harassment, whether the employer made additional efforts to 
prevent harassment beyond its harassment policy, and whether the 
employer exhibited any other defect not captured by the previous 
variables.145 Regarding employees, we coded whether the employee failed 
to report the harassment, whether the employee reported harassment in a 
timely manner, and whether the report was complete.146 
We found that two variables robustly and significantly predicted 
judicial outcomes: employer maintenance of a sexual harassment policy, 
and whether the employer sufficiently corrected harassment.147 Importantly, 
 
139 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 
140 See id. 
141 Seals v. Onondaga County, No. 99-7834, 2000 WL 234446, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 1, 2000). 
142 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2715 (3d ed. 
1998). 
143 See Michael J. Davidson, A Modest Proposal: Permit Interlocutory Appeals of Summary 
Judgment Denials, 147 MIL. L. REV. 145, 149 & nn.24 & 26 (1995). 
144 Sherwyn, Heise & Eigen, supra note 135, at 1266. 
145 Id. at 1279 tbl.1. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 1284 tbl.3a, 1287 tbl.3b, 1288 tbl.3c. 
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employer behavior variables were significant in the model for the 
Unreasonable Employee Prong. This is unexpected because the 
Unreasonable Employee Prong requires evaluation of employee behavior.148 
We offered several plausible explanations for this result, including the 
possibility that judges conflate employer and employee behaviors in their 
analyses.149 The data suggest that judges may be results oriented in their 
jurisprudential approach to cases in this area of law. Their decisions 
appeared to turn on whether the employer attempted to prevent and did 
correct sexual harassment regardless of the clear rule requiring assessment 
of the plaintiff-employee’s behaviors. Contrary to the explicit directions of 
the Supreme Court, employees’ behaviors were mostly irrelevant to the 
courts’ holdings.150 
Our prior study, of course, is not the only empirical examination of 
sexual harassment decisions. David Walsh published an empirical study 
comparing sexual harassment cases before and after Ellerth and 
Faragher.151 His apparent aim was to determine whether the three Title VII 
Supreme Court cases decided in 1998152 had any impact on plaintiffs’ 
success rate. Walsh collected a rich dataset and his findings were broad, but 
he honed in on Ellerth and Faragher cases in one way relevant to the 
present inquiry: Walsh examined the significance of certain key employer 
and employee behaviors in predicting a plaintiff’s success in establishing 
employer liability.153 As we do below,154 and as we did in our prior analysis, 
Walsh constructed a logistic regression model of plaintiffs’ success on the 
liability element of a sexual harassment case.155 As we do below and did 
before, Walsh included independent variables about employers’ preventive 
and corrective efforts and employees’ complaint and post-complaint 
behaviors.156 In contrast to our findings, Walsh observed that employee 
 
148 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (“[T]he plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”). 
149 Sherwyn, Heise & Eigen, supra note 135, at 1285. 
150 Id. at 1289. 
151 David J. Walsh, Small Change: An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Supreme Court 
Precedents on Federal Appeals Court Decisions in Sexual Harassment Cases, 1993–2005, 
30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 461, 476 (2009). 
152 Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
153 See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 151, at 516–17 tbl.11. 
154 See infra Table 4. 
155 Walsh, supra note 151, at 513–15 & tbl.10, 516–17 & tbl.11. 
156 Id. (listing “Failure to Report,” “Delayed Report,” “Failure to Comply With Procedure,” 
“Failure to Cooperate in Investigation,” and “Remedy Offered and Refused”). 
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behavior variables significantly predicted liability.157 Walsh also found that 
the vast majority of affirmative defense cases cited facts relevant to 
establishing both prongs of the affirmative defense.158 From this he 
concluded, “[T]he affirmative defense is being applied in a way that is at 
least superficially faithful to the Supreme Court’s formulation.”159 
We respectfully disagree. What permitted Walsh to find superficial 
faithfulness is likely his taking the judges at their word. Judges could be 
mischaracterizing employee behavior to make results-oriented holdings 
appear facially legitimate. But closer examination of the facts of each case 
(to the extent that objective facts are ascertainable through the judicial 
gloss) would show that many of the employees that courts deem 
“unreasonable” are in fact very reasonable in their actions. 
In addition, an article by Anne Lawton looked at all district and circuit 
court cases citing Ellerth and Faragher up to 2004 but did not perform an 
empirical analysis.160 Rather, Lawton began by decrying the lack of 
empirical evidence to support federal courts’ assertions about what 
constitutes reasonableness under each prong.161 Regarding the Reasonable 
Employer Prong, Lawton argued that federal courts unjustifiably hold that 
certain efforts—like workplace harassment training, promulgation of 
policies with a zero-tolerance standard, explanation of sanctions to 
employees, publication of harassment policies through multiple media,162 
and alternative channels to report—are effective harassment-prevention 
tools.163 In contrast, Lawton argued that social science evidence suggests 
that the central predictors of harassment are organizational culture and the 
gender context of the work performed, both of which have little to do with 
harassment training or the content of a paper policy.164 Thus, Lawton 
concluded, the Reasonable Employer Prong should turn on: (1) efforts to 
implement a policy rather than the content of that policy; (2) content and 
quality of harassment training sessions rather than whether training 
occurred; and (3) more generally, whether an employer made efforts to 
assess the impact of its organizational culture and policies on the incidence 
 
157 Id. at 517–18 & tbl.11. “Facts related to plaintiffs’ failure to mitigate harm . . . had a profound 
effect on the outcome of [affirmative defense] cases.” Id. at 518. 
158 Id. at 511. 
159 Id. 
160 Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative 
Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 210 (2004). 
161 Id. at 207–09. “Thus, the empirical evidence on reporting raises an interesting question: if the 
vast majority of harassment victims do not report harassment, then the reasonable response is not to 
report harassment.” Id. at 209. 
162 For example, distribution of hardcopy policies, combined with periodic trainings on those 
policies, and access to the policies through a company website. 
163 Lawton, supra note 160, at 206–10. 
164 Id. at 225–27. 
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of workplace harassment.165 Regarding the Unreasonable Employee Prong, 
Lawton noted that federal courts often hold that a delay in reporting 
harassment is unreasonable as a matter of law.166 Lawton pointed out, 
however, that a typical sexual harassment victim does not report 
harassment because of credible fears of retaliation, and sexual harassment 
typically involves an accretion of events over time that makes a work 
environment hostile.167 
We wholeheartedly agree with Lawton’s suggestion that sexual 
harassment victims often do not report, and we concur that it is often true 
that delay in reporting is understandable, predictable, logical, and 
reasonable. There is no reason to penalize employees for trying to defuse a 
situation with subtle objections first. This requires an employee to take 
time before lodging a formal complaint and, quite literally, “making a 
federal case” out of it. We diverge from Lawton, however, in one major 
respect. She presumes that judges find that plaintiffs acted unreasonably 
because judges genuinely believe the delays to be unreasonable. In 
contrast, we view such holdings as cognitive gymnastics aimed at 
immunizing employers who acted with the utmost care to prevent (and 
correct) harassment. In either case, circuit and district courts have taken the 
nominal goal of Title VII and the Ellerth–Faragher defense—to prevent 
sexual harassment168—and turned it on its head.169 
IV. METHODOLOGY, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, AND INFERENTIAL MODEL 
This Part reviews the methodology used in this study and provides 
some descriptive statistics. Section A describes our case-selection method. 
Section B describes the choices made in coding variables that measure 
characteristics of the cases. Section C provides relevant descriptive 
statistics. Finally, Section D reviews the model for our inferential statistics. 
A. Case-Selection Method 
This study aimed to evaluate as closely as possible all federal appellate 
court opinions evaluating the merits of the Ellerth–Faragher defense in the 
summary judgment context. This was accomplished by performing a search 
 
165 Id. at 228–35. 
166 Id. at 253, 259. 
167 Id. at 255, 257.  
168 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06 (1998) (“Although Title VII seeks ‘to 
make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination,’ its 
‘primary objective’ . . . is not to provide redress but to avoid harm.” (quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975))).  
169 See infra notes 290–92 and accompanying text. 
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on WestlawNext in the “Federal Courts of Appeal[s]” database using the 
following syntax: 
“summary judgment” & ((sex! gender) /1 haras!) & (ellerth faragher “118 s.ct. 
2257” “524 u.s. 742” “118 s.ct. 2275” “524 u.s. 775”) 
The authors believe that these search terms capture every case that cites or 
mentions Ellerth or Faragher and uses the terms “summary judgment” and 
“sexual harassment” (or variations on these phrases). There may be cases 
that treat the merits of the Ellerth–Faragher defense that do not mention or 
cite Ellerth or Faragher, but such cases are likely rare, especially given the 
prominence of the opinions in this legal area and the low likelihood of 
neither party at least raising the issues. The search was intended to be 
overbroad; indeed, it returned 644 results. Irrelevant cases170 were 
discarded, leaving 131 relevant cases. 
Using circuit court opinions on Westlaw as the basis for empirical 
analysis carries two main limitations. First, appeals represent a tiny fraction 
of all workplace sexual harassment disputes.171 From the broad base of 
“perceived injurious experiences,” only a portion constitutes 
“grievances”—i.e., injurious experiences in which some violation of a right 
has in fact occurred.172 Only some grievances become “claims”—i.e., 
grievances in which the aggrieved party contacts the offender concerning 
the offense.173 Still fewer become “disputes,” or claims in which the 
offender denies responsibility.174 Only a fraction of disputes become formal 
complaints in the form of charges to the EEOC.175 To add yet more levels, 
not all EEOC charges become lawsuits, and all lawsuits do not culminate in 
summary judgment.176 And finally, not all grants of summary judgment are 
appealed. 
 
170 These included a wide variety of false positives. Here is a partial list: Not Title VII, even if 
same standards apply (e.g., state law, other federal statutes); coworker harassment only; not summary 
judgment below (e.g., JMOL, 12(b)(6)); nonsex protected class (e.g., racial harassment, disability-based 
harassment); otherwise did not reach defense (e.g., harassment not severe or pervasive; tangible loss 
established; procedural bar; pre-Ellerth–Faragher standard applied below, and insufficient facts to 
evaluate new standard); and other false positives (e.g., cites Ellerth and Faragher for procedural or 
other proposition). 
171 Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of 
Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663, 681; see also 
Charles A. Brown, Note, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in the District of Maryland, 
96 CORNELL L. REV. 1247, 1252–53 (2011). 
172 Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 171, at 681. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id.  
176 Many are settled or dismissed in earlier pretrial motions. 
109:109 (2015) When Rules Are Made to Be Broken 
139 
Moreover, evidence suggests that “cases drop out of the dispute 
pyramid at a rapid rate.”177 By some estimates, only 70% of grievances 
become claims, 46% of grievances become disputes, and 5% of grievances 
become lawsuits.178 One estimate puts the pretrial settlement rate at 70%.179 
Only about 23% of employment discrimination cases involve a merits 
determination of a summary judgment motion brought by the employer,180 
and about 66% of those merits determinations are pro-defendant.181 
Additionally, plaintiffs appeal pretrial,182 pro-defendant dispositions in 
employment discrimination cases at a rate of only about 24%.183 
Not only do vast numbers of cases drop out of the pyramid, but those 
that do are not randomly selected. Stronger cases (that is, stronger in either 
direction) likely drop out earlier because either the stronger incentives to 
settle or the greater likelihood of an earlier dismissal.184 Consequently, 
cases toward the top of the dispute pyramid are likely to be closer cases 
than those toward the base. Therefore, in interpreting the results of this 
study, one must be careful not to extend inference beyond the appropriate 
level of the pyramid of disputes. However, the reported findings still bear 
importantly on the top of the pyramid and how courts interpret and apply 
 
177 Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 171, at 681. 
178 Id. at 681–82.  
179 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal 
Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 121 (2009). 
180 Vivian Berger et al., Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling Employment Discrimination 
Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45, 53 (2005) (examining a sample of cases in the Eastern and 
Southern Districts of New York). 
181 Id. at 55 tbl.1 (reporting that of a sample of 485 motions for summary judgment brought by 
employers across PACER and published cases, 166 (34.2%) were denied).  
182 “Pretrial” includes procedural postures beyond summary judgment, including motions to 
dismiss, which are not included in this study. 
183 Clermont & Schwab, supra note 179, at 109–10 & display 2 (data based on employment 
discrimination cases spanning from 1988 to 2004); see also Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment 
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 551 
display 1 (2004) (earlier study which previously cited source updates); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. 
Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 
429, 449 tbl.3 (2004) (same); Clermont et al. noted that because of data censoring at the beginning and 
end of their dataset, appeal rates might be somewhat understated. Clermont et al., supra at 550 n.11. All 
told, this would bring the final percentage to 5% * 30% * 23% * 64% * 24% = 0.05%. In other words, 
only 5 of every 10,000 grievances become appeals of summary judgment motions. This is admittedly a 
very crude, unscientific measure, which is why it is relegated to a footnote. 
184 DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT 
TRIAL 72 (1966) (noting limited exceptions to the general rule that closer cases go to trial more often); 
H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS 
ADJUSTMENTS 220–21 (1970) (same); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 101 n.16 (1974) (same). 
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Ellerth and Faragher. The extent to which these findings trickle down to 
lower tiers of the pyramid is beyond the scope of this Article.185 
The other limitation endemic to studies that rely solely on circuit court 
opinions available on Westlaw is that those opinions exhibit selection bias. 
Not all cases are published, and those that are published are not randomly 
selected.186 While many unpublished opinions are available on Westlaw, 
circuits vary in the degree to which they publicize unpublished opinions.187 
Additionally, unpublished opinions affirm pro-defendant grants of 
summary judgment far more often than published opinions.188 Thus, 
whatever the rate of affirmance observed in this study is, the true 
affirmance rate, especially in circuits that restrict unpublished opinions, is 
likely higher, though it is impossible to quantify how much higher. 
B. Coding Method 
A primary question of interest in this study is how various independent 
variables impact the success of the Ellerth–Faragher affirmative defense. 
Like our prior work, this study examines the impact of these variables on 
the success of each prong of the defense and the defense overall. Thus, we 
include three indicator variables: two for whether the employer satisfied the 
Reasonable Employer and Unreasonable Employee Prongs, and a third for 
whether the employer satisfied both prongs. Five clusters of independent 
variables were coded for each case: (1) employer behavior, (2) employee 
behavior, (3) employer characteristics, (4) employee characteristics, and (5) 
other case characteristics. 
1. Employer Behavior.—The employer behavior cluster concerns 
employers’ efforts to “prevent” and “correct” harassment insofar as they 
are relevant to the Reasonable Employer Prong of the affirmative defense. 
 
185 See, e.g., Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Scaling the Pyramid: A Sociolegal Model of 
Employment Discrimination Litigation, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH 
3–34 (2005); William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, 
Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1981); Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, 
Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525 
(1981); Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 171. 
186 Clermont et al., supra note 183, at 548–50 (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the 
study’s electronic database); David Sherwyn & Michael Heise, The Gross Beast of Burden of Proof: 
Experimental Evidence on How the Burden of Proof Influences Employment Discrimination Case 
Outcomes, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 901, 926–27 (2010) (citing authority supporting the proposition that cases 
that are reported are not random). 
187 Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 
239, 245 (2001).  
188 The rate of affirmance observed was 54.8% for published opinions and 84.1% for unpublished 
opinions, which is statistically significantly different (chi2 (1, N = 131) = 13.34, p < 0.001). See also id., 
at 247 (similarly noting that unpublished opinions in disability discrimination cases “are 
overwhelmingly affirmances of pro-defendant results at trial”).  
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Relating to the “prevention” portion of the Reasonable Employer Prong, we 
coded two variables. The first is an indicator variable for whether an 
employer had a “good” anti-harassment policy in place. A “good” policy is 
one that has been disseminated to employees189 and provides alternative 
channels to report harassment, permitting a harassed employee to avoid 
having to report a supervisor’s alleged harassment to the offending 
supervisor.190 Of the 131 cases, 110 employers had a policy (84%). Of the 
110 employers that had a policy, 69 (63%) were considered good policies 
by the court. The second is an indicator variable for whether an employer 
took preventive efforts beyond maintaining a good policy (e.g., establishing 
a “1-800” hotline or conducting harassment training). Forty-nine (37.4%) 
employers were described as having taken other such efforts. Only one of 
the employers that did not have a harassment policy in place took “other 
efforts” as tracked by this variable.191 
Relating to the “correction” portion of the Reasonable Employer 
Prong, we coded two additional variables. The first is an indicator variable 
for whether, upon learning of alleged harassment, an employer responded 
in a way the court characterizes as “good.” Courts are surprisingly 
deferential in this inquiry. While promptly firing a harasser is apparently 
universally considered a good response, far more tepid responses—such as 
transferring an alleged harasser or even an alleged victim to a different 
department—have satisfied this criterion.192 In a few cases, performing an 
investigation that does not culminate in discipline has satisfied this 
criterion.193 In 9 cases, we could not determine with certainty whether the 
employer responded at all, leaving 122. Of the remaining 122 cases, the 
courts described 90 (74%) as good. The second “correction” variable 
indicates whether an employer’s general behavior (other than its response 
to the specific complaint) suffered some defect. This was coded in the 
 
189 Employers varied in their efforts to disseminate the policy. Many employers simply included 
the policy in the employee handbook distributed to each employee upon hiring. Some employers went 
further, requiring employees to sign an attestation that they received, read, and understood the policy. 
Other employers posted the policy in a break room or other employee area. In all of these instances, the 
policy was considered “good,” and we did not distinguish between employers who made minimal 
efforts to disseminate their policies and those who went above and beyond. We chose not to analyze 
this dimension because the minimal potential explanatory value was insufficient to justify the unique 
difficulties in coding and analyzing such a subjective variable. 
190 This definition is adopted from Sherwyn, Heise & Eigen, supra note 135, at 1278.  
191 Mosby-Grant v. City of Hagerstown, 630 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 2010) (harassment training). 
192 See, e.g., Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1300 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(suggesting that offering to transfer the employee was an acceptable response); Valentine v. City of 
Chicago, 452 F.3d 670, 677 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that transferring the harasser was an appropriate 
response); Harmon v. Home Depot USA Inc., 130 F. App’x 902, 905 (9th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that 
transferring the employee would have been an appropriate response). 
193 See, e.g., McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 770–71 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that the 
employer’s investigation, which resulted in the harasser’s termination, shielded it from liability). 
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affirmative when an employer showed that, if an employee were to lodge a 
complaint, the employer might not enforce its sexual harassment policy—
for example, if it failed to investigate complaints in the past or administered 
its policy in bad faith.194 
2. Employee Behavior.—The employee behavior cluster of variables 
captures information relevant to the Unreasonable Employee Prong of the 
defense. We coded four variables. The first is an indicator variable for 
whether the employee-plaintiff reported the harassment. In 113 of the 131 
cases (86%), employee-plaintiffs reported the alleged harassment. Second, 
we coded whether the report was timely.195 This was the case in 77 out of 
the 131 cases (59%). Third, we coded whether there was some defect in the 
employee’s attempt at reporting the alleged harassment. Reports were 
defective if an employee lodged a complaint in a timely fashion but failed 
in some other way—for example, the assertions were too vague to put the 
employer on notice of harassment196 or the employee requested that the 
employer not pursue action against the harasser.197 This was the case 9 
times (6.9%). 
We also separately coded whether the employee failed to cooperate 
with the employer’s corrective efforts. The paradigmatic situation among 
these seven cases is one in which the employee timely reports harassment, 
the employer investigates and offers to move the employee to a new 
department without any reduction in pay, and the employee refuses or 
resigns.198 This happened in 7 of the 131 cases (5.3%). 
3. Employer Characteristics.—The employer characteristics cluster 
consists of two pieces of information: (1) the employer sector (private, 
federal, or state–local) and (2) a categorical variable reflecting the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS)199 number for the 
 
194 See, e.g., Mosby-Grant, 630 F.3d at 337 (employer had a “history of sexual harassment”); 
Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir. 2010) (several of the avenues for 
reporting harassment “appeared to be ineffective or even threatening”); Donaldson v. CDB, Inc., 335 F. 
App’x 494, 505 (5th Cir. 2009) (prior complaints concerning non-harassment issues had proven 
ineffective).  
195 The actual length of the delay, in months, was also collected where available. This variable was 
not used in the models of the prongs or the overall defense because it was available for comparatively 
fewer cases. It was, however, included in the model of Timely because of its theoretical importance to 
whether a delay is reasonable. See infra Part V.  
196 E.g., Episcopo v. Gen. Motors Corp., 128 F. App’x 519, 523 (7th Cir. 2005). 
197 E.g., Hardage v. CBS Broad. Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1188 (9th Cir. 2005); Benefield v. Fulton Co., 
130 F. App’x 308, 312 (11th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 
961 (11th Cir. 2008). 
198 See, e.g., Clegg v. Falcon Plastics Inc., 174 F. App’x 18, 27–28 (3d Cir. 2006). 
199 NAICS is the standard used by the U.S. government to classify businesses for a variety of 
statistical purposes. Introduction to NAICS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/eos/www/
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employer’s business. The first two digits correspond with one of twenty 
broad industry categories.200 Each successive digit corresponds to a more 
specific subcategory within that industry.201 In the analysis, to reduce the 
number of levels in the variable, we used only the first two digits of the 
NAICS numbers. We coded this variable only if enough information about 
the employer was available in the opinion and online to be confident in the 
classification. This was the case in 128 out of 131 employers (98%). 
4. Employee Characteristics.—The employee characteristics cluster 
consists of eight pieces of information. When available, we coded 
plaintiffs’ gender, race, and sexual orientation. Race and sexual orientation 
were ultimately excluded from the analyses because of widespread 
unavailability. We also coded the Standard Occupational Classification 
(SOC)202 number and the O*NET Job Zone number for the employee’s 
occupation. SOC is six digits long, with each successive digit 
corresponding to a more specific job subcategory.203 We used only the first 
two digits to constrain the number of levels in the variable. This was 
available for 95 (72%) of the cases analyzed. O*NET Job Zone number is a 
classification system designed to overlay the SOC system. Instead of 
classifying occupations by job duties, it uses five categories based on the 
education, training, and experience needed for a given occupation.204 This 
was available for 91 (70%) of the cases analyzed. 
We also coded the employee’s tenure at the company in months. If the 
employee was still employed when the lawsuit was filed, we considered 
their tenure as running from the employee’s start date until the employee 
filed the lawsuit. For the 79 employees for whom we measured tenure 
(60%), the mean was 53.8 months (std. dev. = 59.3). The minimum tenure 
was 2 months, and the maximum was 264. Furthermore, we coded whether 
the EEOC was a party in the lawsuit (5 cases, or 3.8%). Finally, we coded 
 
naics/ [http://perma.cc/LL4-CM4P]. The White House’s Office of Management and Budget developed 
NAICS in 1997 to replace the Standard Industrial Classification system. Id. 
200 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/eos/www/
naics/faqs/faqs.html [http://perma.cc/7UH6-29JE].  
201 See id.  
202 Standard Occupational Classification, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/SOC/ 
[http://perma.cc/7MH2-2J8T]. Like NAICS, SOC is a federal standard classification system developed 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
203 Alissa Emmel & Theresa Cosca, The 2010 SOC: A Classification System Gets an Update, 
OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK Q., Summer 2010, at 13, 15, available at http://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/
2010/summer/art02.pdf [http://perma.cc/5V7P-5ZBT]. 
204 NAT’L CTR. FOR O*NET DEV., PROCEDURES FOR O*NET JOB ZONE ASSIGNMENT 3 (2008), 
available at http://www.onetcenter.org/dl_files/JobZoneProcedure.pdf [http://perma.cc/XZ25-QV6H]. 
O*NET Job Zone was developed and is maintained by the National Center for O*NET Development 
under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Labor. About Us, O*NET, http://www.onetcenter.org/
about.html [http://perma.cc/YEM6-ANZX]. 
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whether the case involved a group or class of plaintiffs (10 cases, or 7.6%), 
as opposed to an individual plaintiff 
5. Other Case Characteristics.—The final cluster contains other 
information about the case, including which court of appeals decided the 
case and whether the opinion was published or unpublished. Mainly for 
descriptive purposes, we also coded details about the nature of the 
harassment, including duration of the harassment, whether the harassment 
took the form of a pattern of behavior or isolated instances of harassment, 
whether the plaintiff was harassed by only supervisors or both supervisors 
and coworkers, where the harassment took place, and what the alleged 
harassing behavior was. The length of the delay in months was also 
collected where available, and this variable was used in modeling the 
timeliness of the complaint.205 Some opinions expressly specified how long 
the plaintiff delayed before complaining. Other opinions did not specify the 
delay, but otherwise indicated how long the harassment lasted; we used the 
length of the harassment in these cases unless there was some indication 
that the plaintiff complained earlier. 
6. Coding Limitations.—One problem pervaded the coding process: 
appellate opinions frequently lack the level of detail needed for content-
rich coding. For instance, to be coded as having a “good policy,” the 
employer’s policy must be disseminated and provide alternative reporting 
channels.206 Plaintiffs, however, do not always challenge the sufficiency of 
the policy, opting instead to challenge the correction portion of the 
Reasonable Employer Prong or only the Unreasonable Employee Prong. If 
the plaintiff does not challenge the policy the court is less likely to describe 
the policy in sufficient detail. Moreover, plaintiff’s decision not to 
challenge the policy increases the likelihood that it is a good policy given 
the low incremental cost of challenging the policy weighed against the 
possible downsides associated with challenging it—if a plaintiff attempts to 
challenge a good policy, they might lose credibility with the fact finder or 
inadvertently shine a spotlight on the employer’s apparent diligence to 
prevent harassment. Therefore, our measures likely underreport the number 
of employers with good policies, as well as the effect of having a good 
policy on the success of the defense is likely underestimated. 
A similar problem plagues the occupational classification variables. 
Appellate courts have little use for specifics about employers’ business 
models or employees’ job duties except insofar as they inform whether the 
harasser was a supervisor or coworker. Often the only information provided 
is the name of the business and the employee’s job title. Where possible, 
 
205 See infra Table 5. 
206 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
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we supplemented the information with research conducted on the Internet. 
Still, a reader should have comparatively less confidence in the NAICS, 
SOC, and Job Zone numbers, and caution is urged in interpreting the 
findings with respect to these variables. 
C. Do Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs Fare Better on Appeal than  
the Average Discrimination Plaintiff? 
While not scientific, a descriptive comparison to other types of 
discrimination cases suggests that sexual harassment plaintiffs fare better 
on appeal than the average discrimination plaintiff. This Section serves to 
contextualize our study among empirical studies that have come before it. 
Appellate courts affirmed pro-defendant summary judgment dispositions at 
a rate of 70% in our sample. Studies in comparable areas have found both 
higher and lower affirmance rates. For example, Clermont and Schwab 
found pretrial, pro-defendant employment discrimination dispositions were 
affirmed on appeal at a rate exceeding 89% between 1988 and 2004.207 This 
is statistically significantly higher than the 70% affirmance rate observed in 
our study.208 In another study, Clermont, Eisenberg, and Schwab evaluated 
federal civil rights-type cases more broadly from 1988 to 2000, finding an 
affirmance rate of 87% for pretrial, pro-defendant dispositions,209 which is 
also significantly higher than the 70% rate observed here.210 Juliano and 
Schwab examined all appeals of sexual harassment cases from 1986 to 
1995 and found an affirmance rate of 73%,211 which is not statistically 
distinct from the 70% rate we observe. This study included appeals from all 
procedural postures, including pretrial and post trial. Note, however, that 
Juliano and Schwab’s study ended before Ellerth and Faragher were 
decided. Additionally, Walsh’s study of affirmative defense cases, 
described earlier, found a pro-defendant appellate disposition rate of 
 
207 Clermont & Schwab, supra note 179, at 109–10 & display 2; see also Clermont et al., supra 
note 183, at 553 display 2 (noting a plaintiff reversal rate—i.e., the complement of the affirmance 
rate—of 10.66% from 1988 to 2000). 
208 Two-sided z-test of the proportion of affirmations observed in the instant set of cases (92 of 
131) against Clermont & Schwab’s proportion (1133 of 10,598) results in a p-value less than 0.001. See 
Clermont & Schwab, supra note 179, at 109–10 & display 2. 
209 Clermont et al., supra note 183, at 562–63 display 8 (noting plaintiff reversal rates of 8.4%, 
26%, and 13% for prisoner civil rights, marine contracts, and federal civil rights-type cases overall, 
respectively). 
210 Two-sided z-test of the proportion of affirmed cases observed in the instant data set (92 of 131) 
against Clermont, Eisenberg & Schwab’s proportion (13.27% of 60,667), see id., results in a p-value of 
less than 0.001. Because 13.27% of 60,667 could result from an x value of anywhere from 8048 to 
8053, 8048 was used as the most conservative value.  
211 See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 88, at 574. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
146 
60%.212 This rate is only marginally significantly different from our 
observed 70% affirmance rate at the lower significance level of 90%.213 
A number of differences exist between the sample examined in this 
Article and the samples that bore these other affirmance rates. Clermont 
and Schwab and Clermont, Eisenberg, and Schwab examined all pretrial 
dispositions; here, we examine only summary judgments. They looked at 
all forms of employment discrimination; we examined a much smaller 
subset on several dimensions—only Title VII, only sexual harassment, only 
cases lacking tangible loss, only supervisor harassment, and only merits 
determinations on the Ellerth–Faragher defense. Past studies also 
examined different time periods than ours does: Clermont, Eisenberg, and 
Schwab’s study covered 1988–2000, and Clermont and Schwab examined 
cases from 1988–2004, whereas our study examines a different, more 
recent period (1998–2012). 
Juliano and Schwab’s study looked at sexual harassment cases, which 
is certainly narrower than all types of discrimination cases, so their set of 
cases is more similar to our set of cases along that dimension. Other 
characteristics of their dataset, however, were different: their timeframe 
was earlier still (1986–1995), and they included appeals after trial along 
with pretrial appeals. Walsh’s sample seems to be the most comparable—
he ostensibly examined only affirmative defense cases.214 Walsh’s 
description of the data he observed is somewhat opaque, making it difficult 
to ascertain the relevance of the observed pro-defendant affirmance rate, 
which is statistically lower than our rate. 
Ultimately, further research that controls for all of these variables—
time, type of discrimination, procedural posture below, and affirmative 
defense versus non-affirmative defense—is necessary to appropriately 
determine what accounts for the differences in rates. Preliminarily, though, 
it seems the affirmance rates in studies of sexual harassment cases are 
lower than those in studies of employment discrimination cases in general. 
This suggests that sexual harassment plaintiffs fare better on appeal than 
the average discrimination plaintiff. 
 
212 Walsh, supra note 151, at 507 tbl.8 (this figure ignores the four cases in which liability was 
inconclusive; 60% is calculated as the 56 cases in which no employer liability compared with the 38 
cases in which employer liability was established). 
213 Two-sided test of our proportion (92 of 131) against Walsh’s proportion (56 of 94), see id., 
results in a p-value of 0.097. 
214 Walsh was a bit imprecise in delineating exactly which cases he examined, making it difficult to 
ascertain just how comparable his sample was to our sample. 
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D. How Effective Are Employers at Asserting 
 the Affirmative Defense? 
Out of the 131 cases, the court addressed the merits of both prongs in 
119 cases (91%). In eight additional cases the court addressed only the 
Reasonable Employer Prong, and in the four remaining cases the court 
addressed only the Unreasonable Employee Prong. 
Seventy-eight percent of employers satisfied the Reasonable Employer 
Prong in cases that addressed the merits of the Reasonable Employer 
Prong. That proportion dropped slightly to 75% for the Unreasonable 
Employee Prong. Overall, the defense was successful 70% of the time. In 
49% of the cases in which defendants were unsuccessful on appeal, they 
failed to satisfy both prongs. Defendants failed to satisfy the first or 
Unreasonable Employee Prong alone in 21% and 31% of unsuccessful 
appeals, respectively. Interestingly, if the court addressed both prongs and 
the defendant satisfied only one of them, it was always the Reasonable 
Employer Prong. 
Table 1 reviews employer preventative behavior. As noted above, 84% 
of the employers involved in this study had a policy, but only 73% of cases 
indicated that the policy was adequately disseminated, and only 54% of 
cases indicated that the policy contained alternative channels to report 
harassment. Thus, only 53% of cases provided enough detail to conclude 
that the employer’s policy was a “good” policy. Employers provided 
workplace harassment training in 31% of cases and had a 1-800 harassment 
hotline in 19% of cases, resulting in 37% of employers making “other 
efforts.”215 
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ABOUT EMPLOYER EFFORTS TO  
PREVENT HARASSMENT 
Preventative Measure Percent 
Had a policy 84% 
Disseminated the policy 73% 
Policy provided alternative channels of redress 54% 
Court considered it a “good” policy 53% 
Employer made other efforts 37% 
Employer trained employees 31% 
1-800 report line provided 19% 
Policy described the penalty 13% 
Policy promised investigation of complaints 26% 
Had anti-retaliation policy 15% 
 
 
215 See text accompanying notes 189–94. 
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Employers responded appropriately to harassment in 69% of cases. 
However, employers only fired alleged harassers in 21% of cases, and 
disciplined alleged harassers in some other way (from a verbal warning up 
to a demotion, but short of termination) in 23% of cases. Transfer occurred 
in 15% of cases—the harasser half of the time and the employee the other 
half. In 14% of cases, the employer investigated the complaint but took no 
further action. Lastly, in 21% of cases, the employer did nothing at all. 
In 81% of cases, the employee reported the harassment to the correct 
person as determined by the court. In 59% of cases, the complaint was 
timely. In 7% of cases, the employee’s claim suffered from some other 
defect, such as vagueness, and in 5% of cases, the employee rejected the 
corrective action the employer offered. 
Tables 2 and 3 present data that, while not used directly in the 
inferential statistics presented in this Article, serve to illustrate where our 
sample of cases fits in context of the broader American workplace. Table 2 
presents characteristics of employers and employees involved in the cases 
in this study. Most defendants were private sector employers (71%). Of the 
public sector employers, roughly one-sixth were federal and five-sixths 
were state or local government actors. In the private sector, distribution 
across NAICS industries was dispersed—the modal industry was 
manufacturing (13%), followed by retail (11%) and accommodation and 
food services (9%), and there were no employers in the NAICS categories 
for agriculture, utilities, wholesale trade, management of companies, or 
other services. Plaintiffs were overwhelmingly female (95%) and were 
concentrated in O*NET job zones two and three, with comparatively fewer 
employees in jobs requiring very low or very high education, training, and 
experience. Only about one-quarter of employees had been at their 
company for less than one year before filing the discrimination lawsuit; 
most employees’ tenures were between one and ten years long. Finally, in 
4% of cases, the EEOC represented the employee, and in 8% of cases, the 
case involved more than one employee-plaintiff. 
Table 3 reports information about the harassing conduct, where 
available. Eighty-four percent of cases involved workplace-only 
harassment. Harassment extended beyond the workplace in only 17% of 
cases, and in no case was the harassment relegated to non-work-related 
areas, though courts frequently explain that harassment need not occur 
within the workplace to be actionable.216 Table 3 also lists the frequency of 
different forms of harassment. General sexually charged comments and 
 
216 Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2001); Douglas R. Garmager, 
Discrimination Outside of the Office: Where to Draw the Walls of the Workplace for a “Hostile Work 
Environment” Claim Under Title VII, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1075, 1076 (2010) (noting that the 
Seventh Circuit has held that “harassment does not have to take place within the physical confines of 
the workplace to be actionable; it need only have consequences in the workplace”). 
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sexual contact were the most frequently alleged behaviors, though these are 
also two of the less-specific categories. Comments about the plaintiff’s 
appearance, nonsexual contact, and requests for sexual favors were also 
very common. Less common were things like love letters, written 
comments to the plaintiff, and displaying pornographic materials, as well as 
the most severe behavior, sexual assault. 
The duration of the harassment and the delay in reporting the 
harassment were also recorded. About half of the cases involved 
harassment that lasted up to six months, and roughly half of the cases 
involved harassment that lasted between six months and five years, with 
very few cases of harassment lasting longer than that. The trend in the 
length of time it took the plaintiff to report the harassment is the same. This 
confirms the intuition that harassment, in the vast majority of cases, does 
not last long beyond the time an employee reports it to the employer. It also 
lends some support to the proposition that employer corrective efforts were 
generally efficacious in these sexual harassment cases. 
E. Empirical Strategy 
The following analysis models employer success on each prong of the 
affirmative defense, and on the defense overall, as a function of eight 
independent variables—those relating to employer and employee behavior 
described in Part III.B. In all three analyses, the dependent variable is 
dichotomous (taking the value 1 if an employer satisfied the prong/defense; 
0 if not). We therefore use logistic regression in the models below. 
Two barriers emerged that complicated the analysis: slight 
multicollinearity and quasi-complete separation. First, multicollinearity 
refers to unacceptably high correlation among independent variables in a 
model. Multicollinearity exists only in the model for the Reasonable 
Employer Prong217 with respect to two independent variables, whether the 
employer responded adequately to a complaint and whether there was some 
defect in the employer’s general conduct. Therefore, we modeled the 
Reasonable Employer Prong twice, first omitting the “defect” variable 
(Model A), and second omitting the “good response” variable (Model B). 
Multicollinearity did not exist in the models of the Unreasonable Employee 
Prong or the defense overall. 
 
217 In some cases, courts address one prong but not the other. As a result, the model for the 
Reasonable Employer Prong has a different set of observations than the models for the Unreasonable 
Employee Prong and the overall defense. This explains how multicollinearity can exist in one model but 
not in other models that use the same independent variables.  
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TABLE 2: EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE CHARACTERISTICS 
Variable Percent 
EMPLOYER  
    Employer Sector  
        Private 71% 
        Public—Federal 5% 
        Public—State/Local 24% 
    NAICS Number  
        21–Mining, Quarrying, and Oil/Gas Extraction 2% 
        31 to 33–Manufacturing 13% 
        44/45–Retail Trade 11% 
        48/49–Transportation/Warehousing 5% 
        51–Information 8% 
        52–Finance and Insurance 6% 
        53–Real Estate and Rental/Leasing 2% 
        54–Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 2% 
        56–Administrative/Support and Waste             
    Management/Remediation 
3% 
        61–Educational Services 8% 
        62–Health Care and Social Assistance 8% 
        71–Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 1% 
        72–Accommodation and Food Services 9% 
        92–Public Administration 21% 
EMPLOYEE  
    Sex  
        Male 5% 
        Female 95% 
    O*NET Job Zone Number  
        Level 1 15% 
        Level 2 37% 
        Level 3 27% 
        Level 4 14% 
        Level 5 5% 
    Tenure  
        0–6 months 19% 
        6 months–1 year 8% 
        1–5 years 43% 
        5–10 years 19% 
        >10 years 11% 
    EEOC Was a Party 4% 
    Multi-plaintiff Lawsuit 8% 
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TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ABOUT HARASSING CONDUCT 
Variable Percent 
Location of Harassment  
        Workplace Only 84% 
        Workplace & Work Events 4% 
        Workplace & Social Events 7% 
        All Three 6% 
Conduct Alleged  
        Derogatory Names Generally 11% 
        Insults Directed to Plaintiff 17% 
        Comments About Appearance 38% 
        Sexually Charged Comments Generally 73% 
        Sexual Gestures 16% 
        Written Sexual Comments 3% 
        Love Letters to Plaintiff 3% 
        Sexual Contact 54% 
        Nonsexual Contact 37% 
        Requests for Dates 19% 
        Requests for Sexual Favors 37% 
        Displaying Pornographic Materials 7% 
        Sexual Assault 9% 
        Nonsexual, Gender-Related Behavior 8% 
Duration Alleged  
        One or More Isolated Incidents 12% 
        <1 month 1% 
        1–6 months 42% 
        6 months–1 year 21% 
        1–5 years 31% 
        >5 years 5% 
Length of Delay  
        <1 month 1% 
        1–6 months 48% 
        6 months–1 year 19% 
        1–5 years 28% 
        >5 years 3% 
 
Second, separation occurs when the dependent variable has the same 
value for all observations in which an independent variable takes on a 
given value. In the context of this study, for example, whenever plaintiffs’ 
reports of harassment were deemed untimely, the defendant had always 
satisfied the Unreasonable Employee Prong. This makes sense because an 
untimely complaint qualifies as an employee unreasonably failing to take 
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advantage of corrective opportunities.218 When such a relationship between 
independent and dependent variables exists, the coefficient of the 
independent variable is undetermined (it is infinite). 
One remedy is simply to exclude the problematic variable.219 But this 
often means excluding a variable that impacts the dependent variable in 
important ways, which constitutes deliberate specification bias.220 For 
example, we would prefer not to exclude the timeliness of an employee’s 
report from the model because we consider it an important determinant of 
whether the Unreasonable Employee Prong is met. 
Statistics authorities recognize that the ideal solution to separation for 
the type of analysis we are performing (logistic regression) is to use what is 
called Firth’s penalized-likelihood approach.221 The approach does not 
remove problematic variables but instead modifies the way in which the 
coefficients for those variables are estimated.222 Thus, our models apply 
Firth’s penalized-likelihood model. 
V. RESULTS 
Table 4 reports coefficients and their respective significance levels, as 
well as the goodness-of-fit measures223 for each model (Wald Chi-squared 
test and proportional reduction in error (PRE) for each model). In the 
sections following Table 4, the models for each of the dependent variables 
are treated in turn, discussing specifically what conclusions may be drawn 
from the analysis. 
A. The Reasonable Employer Prong 
The results of the model of the Reasonable Employer Prong suggest 
that in assessing the reasonableness of employers, judges have no need for 
 
218 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). Therefore, in all the cases in 
which Timely = 0, there are no cases where Prong 2 = 0; but when Timely = 1, Prong 2 is 1 in some 
cases and 0 in others (an example of quasi-complete separation). 
219 Christopher Zorn, A Solution to Separation in Binary Response Models, 13 POL. ANALYSIS 157, 
161 (2005). 
220 Id. at 161–62. 
221 E.g., Georg Heinze & Michael Schemper, A Solution to the Problem of Separation in Logistic 
Regression, 21 STATS. MED. 2409, 2409–11 (2002); Zorn, supra note 219, at 165–66 (“Firth’s method 
prevents researchers from being forced either to omit manifestly important covariates from their models 
or to engage in post-hoc data manipulation in order to obtain parameter estimates for those 
covariates.”); see also David Firth, Bias Reduction of Maximum Likelihood Estimates, 80 BIOMETRIKA 
27, 27–38 (1993). These authorities note that other alternatives are inferior, such as using exact logistic 
regression, manipulating the data, or using an arbitrary standard value as the estimate for the 
problematic variable’s coefficient. Heinze & Schemper, supra, at 2418; Zorn, supra note 219, at 165. 
222 Heinze & Schemper, supra note 221, at 2411–12. 
223 Goodness-of-fit measures, as the name suggests, can be thought of as metrics to compare 
models in terms of how well they explain variation in the data. 
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gamesmanship. To satisfy the Reasonable Employer Prong, an employer 
must show it took reasonable steps to prevent and correct harassment.224 As 
we hypothesized in prior empirical findings reporting district courts’ 
application of the affirmative defense, satisfaction of the Reasonable 
Employer Prong of the affirmative defense should be a function primarily 
of employer, rather than employee, behavior. Whereas the variables 
relating to the employers’ corrective actions (Good Response and Employer 
Defect) were significant in predicting success, variables relating to the 
employers’ preventive efforts (Good Policy and Other Efforts) were 
nonsignificant. This observation could suggest that courts consider an 
employer’s enforcement of its anti-harassment policies to be more 
important than the details of the policies themselves. The more persuasive 
explanation, however, comes from the different forms of evidence required 
to prove prevention and correction. Employers may satisfy the prevention 
portion of the Reasonable Employer Prong with documentary evidence; 
they may submit their anti-harassment policy and, in many cases, the 
employee’s signed acknowledgment of her receipt of that policy. This 
leaves little for the plaintiff to credibly dispute, and it may explain the 
phenomenon noted in Part V.D of plaintiffs opting not to challenge the 
sufficiency of the policy. In contrast, the “correction” inquiry involves 
different forms of proof—records and testimony concerning the 
investigation of harassment as well as records and testimony concerning 
the disciplinary action taken against the harasser. The correction inquiry 
involves far more for a plaintiff to materially dispute. Similarly, there are 
more opportunities for a judge to decide that the “reasonableness” question 
is better left to the jury than declared as a matter of law. This could account 
for the lack of significance of prevention-related variables and, in contrast, 
the high significance of whether the employer’s response was “good” and 
whether the employer’s conduct included some defect otherwise 
(correction-related variables). 
Employee-behavior variables were significant in both models for 
predicting employers’ success at proving the Reasonable Employer Prong, 
likely due to the effect of employees’ behavior on the employers’ ability to 
respond to harassment. This is consistent with the suggested explanation 
offered above. Once again, the form of evidence relevant on summary 
judgment brings the correction portion of the Reasonable Employer Prong 
into focus. But the reasonableness of the employer’s corrective efforts 
depends in large part on the employee’s behavior. For example, if an 
employee’s report of harassment is vague or the employee refuses to 
participate in the internal investigation, it can impede the employer’s ability 
to determine whether the alleged harassment occurred. Courts assessing the 
 
224 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998).  
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reasonableness of employers in these cases may be more forgiving. 
Similarly, if an employee never reports harassment there is no obligation 
for the employer to take any corrective action. Either way, the 
reasonableness of the corrective action depends on the employee’s 
behavior. 
 




       Prong 1 Prong 2 Overall Defense 
(A) (B) 
Employee Behavior     
    Good Policy -0.62 0.08 0.37 -0.35 
    Other Efforts -0.01 -0.68 -1.58 -0.90 
    Good Response 4.28*** — 2.67* 2.69* 
    Employer Defect — 4.04*** -2.30 -2.77 
     
Employee Behavior     
    Employee Reported    
Harassment 
-2.45** -1.93 -4.15*** -4.24*** 
    Report Was Timely -3.22** -4.01** -5.70*** -6.05*** 
    Report Was 
Otherwise Defective 
2.64** 1.32 4.11** 4.14** 
    Employee Rejected 
    the Redress Offered 
3.60* 3.90* 5.34* 6.55*** 
     
Constant 3.75** 7.08*** 7.42*** 7.90*** 
Wald Chi-Squared 26.16*** 26.07*** 15.64** 14.67* 
PRE 81% 85% 87% 87% 
N 127 127 123 131 
* SIGNIFIES P < 0.10; ** SIGNIFIES P < 0.05; *** SIGNIFIES P < 0.01  
 
To summarize, the Reasonable Employer Prong is entirely 
unremarkable. We expected as much, because the standard for this prong—
that the employer exercised reasonable efforts to prevent and correct 
harassment—is uncontroversial. Accordingly, judges have no reason to be 
duplicitous in the name of achieving justice or incentivizing behavior. This 
is harmonious with our thesis that judges depart from rationality only when 
there is sufficient justification for doing so. 
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B. The Unreasonable Employee Prong 
To satisfy the Unreasonable Employee Prong of the defense, 
employers must show that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of preventive or corrective opportunities the employer provided. 
The most straightforward hypothesis was borne out: all employee-behavior 
variables were highly significant. Courts assessing the reasonableness of 
employees pay close attention to employee behavior. 
But at the same time, we see evidence of results-oriented adjudicating: 
the significance of the variable for the quality of the employer’s response to 
the report of harassment. In theory, the employee’s reasonableness 
logically cannot turn on the employer’s response because the employee’s 
behavior precedes the employer’s response to that behavior. But in this 
study and in our earlier study, employer behavior is a significant predictor 
of the employee’s reasonableness.225 
We initially offered two explanations for this counterintuitive result, 
which the results in the instant study do not substantiate. First, we 
suggested that courts allow employers to “make or break” their own cases 
because employers are asking for summary judgment on an affirmative 
defense and they bear the burden of proof. This explanation could account 
for the significance of the employer’s response in predicting success on the 
Unreasonable Employee Prong—employers who do not satisfactorily 
respond to complaints do not deserve the benefit of summary judgment on 
either prong. But it is less persuasive here than it perhaps was before 
because this model finds employee behavior highly significant. 
Second, we suggested that courts may conflate employer and 
employee behavior. This explanation could also account for the 
significance of the response. Perhaps the reasonableness of the employer’s 
behavior informs the court’s assessment of the employee’s behavior. For 
example, if an employer does not satisfactorily respond to a complaint of 
harassment, it could signal a systemic flaw in the employer’s harassment–
complaint system, justifying the employee’s delay in reporting the 
harassment. This would explain the positive, significant effect that a good 
response has on satisfying the Unreasonable Employee Prong. It is 
reasonable to expect that if this hypothesis were true, judges would explain 
their reasoning in the written opinions. But we found no evidence in the 
opinions supporting this hypothesis. 
Rather, judges’ ostensible silence regarding the role of employer 
behavior counsel in favor of a third explanation: the same results-oriented 
holdings affect the analysis. The significance of the employer’s response 
 
225 Sherwyn, Heise & Eigen, supra note 135, at 1285–87 & tbl.3B (finding significant variables 
relating to whether the employer had a good harassment policy and whether the employer’s response to 
the report of harassment was sufficient). 
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must be viewed together with the significance of employee-behavior 
variables. The significance of both employee and employer behavior 
suggests that the court is engaging in mental gymnastics to avoid 
penalizing well-behaved employers. The Unreasonable Employee Prong is 
supposed to evaluate employee behavior. In theory, the employer’s 
response is immaterial to whether the employee acted unreasonably 
precisely because it takes place after the employee’s behavior. But it is 
hard to justify applying vicarious liability to an employer that did all it 
reasonably could have done to both prevent and correct harassment. The 
result we have observed suggests that, when confronted with an employer 
who corrects well, courts scrutinize the employee’s conduct to find it 
unreasonable. 
Courts appear to accomplish this result via the timeliness of the 
employee’s complaint. In many cases, the only employee defect the court is 
able to highlight is a period of delay in reporting harassment. These periods 
can be surprisingly short; for example, the Tenth Circuit in Conatzer v. 
Medical Professional Building Services Corp. held a seventeen-day delay 
unreasonable as a matter of law.226 Consider that, in Conatzer, the employer 
had a sterling anti-harassment policy and upon learning of the harassment 
promptly investigated and fired the harasser.227 On the other hand, courts 
have rejected far longer periods of delay as a basis for finding the employee 
unreasonable. Unsurprisingly, in many of these cases, the employer’s 
response to the report of harassment was less than ideal. For example, in 
Clegg v. Falcon Plastics Inc., the court held that a plaintiff’s four-month 
delay was not unreasonable as a matter of law.228 As for corrective action, 
the employer had investigated but only at the employee’s repeated 
insistence, and at the conclusion of the investigation, the employer only 
offered to transfer the employee.229 Similarly, in Walker v. United Parcel 
Service of America, Inc., the employee endured sexual harassment for 
seven years before complaining to a supervisor.230 When she ultimately did 
complain, the employer took no action.231 It should be obvious that the 
employer failed to satisfy the Reasonable Employer Prong—it did not 
reasonably correct the harassment. But the court also found that the 
employer failed to satisfy the Unreasonable Employee Prong even though 
the plaintiff delayed seven years.232 
 
226 95 F. App’x 276, 281 (10th Cir. 2004). 
227 Id. at 280. 
228 174 F. App’x 18, 26 (3d Cir. 2006). 
229 Id. (“Clegg asserts that Falcon only acted at her repeated insistence.”). 
230 76 F. App’x 881, 883 (10th Cir. 2003).  
231 Id. 
232 Id. at 888.  
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Indeed, empirical evidence supports the finding that courts consider 
employer behavior in assessing the timeliness of an employee’s 
harassment. We investigated this relationship by modeling the “timeliness” 
determination as a function of employer corrective action. In two models 
we alternatively modeled timeliness as a function of (1) whether the 
employer had a “good” response and (2) whether the employer’s conduct 
was otherwise defective. In both models we controlled for the length of the 
delay as well as employer preventive behavior and employee behavior. It is 
reasonable to expect that the timeliness of a complaint will vary with (1) 
most importantly, the length of the delay; (2) whether the employee 
complained; and (3) whether there was some other defect, such as 
vagueness, in the employee’s behavior. The two other covariates in theory 
should not influence the timeliness of the complaint, but they were 
included to capture any unexpected association. Note the smaller sample 
size is because not all court opinions specified the length of time the 
plaintiff delayed. As with the model for the Reasonable Employer Prong, 
the variables for whether the employer’s response was “good” and whether 
the employer’s behavior was otherwise defective were unacceptably 
correlated with one another so they were omitted in alternative Models A 
and B. Additionally, in Model B, the “defect” variable exhibited quasi-
complete separation with the dependent variable, so Firth’s penalized-
likelihood was used. Model A exhibited no separation. Table 5 lists 
coefficients and overall model tests for these analyses. 
As hypothesized, both the employer’s response and, alternatively, 
whether there was another defect in the employer’s behavior are significant 
predictors of the likelihood a court will find an employee’s complaint 
timely, even when controlling for the length of the delay and the 
employee’s other behavior. Admittedly, because observational studies say 
nothing of causation, this empirical outcome could have either of two 
explanations: Either it is the product of results-oriented adjudication, or 
some real-world correlation exists between employee timeliness and 
employer behavior. The latter explanation is unsatisfying because Good 
Response has a negative coefficient and Employer Defect has a positive 
coefficient.233 In other words, that explanation would suggest that 
employees may delay longer when employers are better at correcting 
harassment, contrary to the intuitive situation of an employer being worse 
at responding to harassment giving employees more of a reason to delay 
reporting. 
 
233 Employer’s Good Response is negatively correlated with Employer Defect (r = -.75, p < .001). 
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    Good Response -3.74*** — 
    Employer Defect — 4.64*** 
   
Covariates   
    Delay Length 0.02 0.01 
    Good Policy 0.05 -0.01 
    Other Efforts 0.60 0.39 
    Complained -2.39*** -2.29*** 
    EE Defect 1.08 0.59 
   
Constant 4.51*** 1.07 
Wald Chi-Squared 48.42*** 19.08*** 
PRE 70% 60% 
N 99 99 
* SIGNIFIES P < 0.10; ** SIGNIFIES P < 0.05; *** SIGNIFIES P < 0.01 
Results-oriented adjudication is more likely to be the explanation. But, 
econometrically, alternative mechanisms may not be ruled out. This result 
provides empirical evidence that courts seize on any delay in reporting 
harassment as an ex post justification for holding well-behaved employers 
harmless. This conclusion is particularly compelling because the model 
controls for the length of the delay, which was nonsignificant.234 In other 
words, in deciding whether a complaint was timely, courts tended to weigh 
the employer’s response more heavily than how long a plaintiff waited. Our 
previous article did not demonstrate this relationship empirically, but it 
predicted this result: “[J]udges are drafting result-oriented opinions in 
which they must comport their conclusions . . . with the language of Ellerth 
and Faragher.”235 This study supports empirically what we inferred a 
decade ago. The problem, of course, is that this conclusion violates the 
clear language of the Ellerth–Faragher defense—if the employee behaves 
reasonably, the defense should be unavailable. 
 
234 The sign of its coefficient was even unexpected. The sign of the coefficient for the length of the 
delay was positive. But one would expect there to be a negative relationship between the length of the 
delay and whether the report is timely. 
235 Sherwyn, Heise & Eigen, supra note 135, at 1294. 
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C. Full Defense 
All employee-behavior variables and one employer-behavior variable 
were significant in predicting success of the defense overall. To prevail on 
the affirmative defense, the employer must satisfy both prongs. Thus, the 
reasonable expectation is for significant factors in the individual-prong 
models to remain significant in the model of the overall defense. This 
hypothesis bore out except with respect to the variable representing 
whether there was a defect in the employer’s general behavior. Thus it is 
likely that, as compared with the employee’s behavior and the employer’s 
response to that behavior, other defects in the employer’s behavior are 
simply not important (or the effect is too small to detect with our sample 
size). While this contrasts with our earlier study that found that employee 
behavior was not significant at all,236 our results here do not undermine the 
central thesis of this Article, that courts consider employer behavior in 
assessing the Unreasonable Employee Prong. This explanation is especially 
convincing given our results, summarized in Table 5, showing that 
employer response is significant to courts’ findings regarding the timeliness 
of employee complaints. 
D. Comparison with Earlier Cases 
Thus we come to one of the same conclusions in this Article as we did 
in our previous one: Judges tend to misapply the Ellerth–Faragher defense 
to achieve just results. But, although we reach the same conclusion, the 
results of our regression analyses diverge substantially. In our earlier work, 
we found the existence of a good policy to be the only consistently 
significant variable across models.237 Here, by contrast, not only does the 
variable for maintenance of a good policy lack significance in all models, 
but also in two of the models, it takes a negative sign—in our previous 
article we found a positive coefficient.238 Additionally, our previous analogs 
for whether the employee complained, whether the complaint was timely, 
and whether there was some other defect in the employee’s behavior all 
lacked significance,239 whereas we now find them significant. And for 
whether the employee complained, the sign of the earlier study’s 
coefficient was the opposite of that observed here.240 Our results agree that 
an employer having a “good” response is significant and positive when 
predicting success under the Unreasonable Employee Prong and the 
 
236 Id. at 1288 tbl.3C. 
237 Id. at 1284 tbl.3A, 1287 tbl.3B, 1288 tbl.3C. 
238 Id. at 1283. 
239 Id. at 1284 tbl.3A, 1287 tbl.3B, 1288 tbl.3C. 
240 Id. 
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defense overall.241 But for the Reasonable Employer Prong, we previously 
did not find employer response to be significant (though it was positive).242 
Table 4 also bears comparison with Walsh’s 1999–2005 results. 
Again, Walsh looked only at the plaintiff’s success in establishing 
employer liability, not the individual prongs.243 Walsh’s results agree with 
ours in the following ways: We both found the existence of a policy to lack 
significance, we both found the employer’s response to be significant,244 
and we both found that whether an employee complained and the 
timeliness of the complaint were significant.245 But Walsh did not find that 
the employee’s rejection of the employer’s corrective action was 
significant, as we do (though the signs of our coefficients agree).246 
What could account for the fact that our earlier article is so different 
from Table 4, yet Walsh’s findings are so similar? The two biggest factors 
are type of court and time frame. 
First, both Walsh’s study and this one looked solely at circuit court 
cases, while our earlier article addressed district court cases. Although 
summary judgment is not supposed to involve fact finding, and although 
summary judgment is reviewed under a de novo standard, it could be that 
district courts are indeed finding facts and circuit courts are deferring to 
those judgments, albeit not expressly. This explanation is unpersuasive, 
however, because it is hard to see how this would lead to the differences 
observed here—if anything, the facts of the employer’s correction and 
employee’s behavior would inure greater benefit from deference, but they 
are precisely the variables that remain significant. Alternatively, appeals 
may not fairly represent district court cases because appeals are not 
randomly selected. This explanation is somewhat more persuasive. As 
stated before, intuitively, the stronger cases in either direction should drop 
out of the dispute pyramid sooner than closer cases.247 Moreover, the way 
courts have interpreted Ellerth and Faragher makes proving or disproving 
the prevention portion of the Reasonable Employer Prong relatively 
straightforward, where the correction portion and the Unreasonable 
Employee prong are more complex and individualized. It is easy to 
imagine, then, how “closer” cases prominently feature employee behavior 
 
241 Id. at 1287 tbl.3B, 1288 tbl.3C. 
242 Id. at 1284 tbl.3A. 
243 See supra notes 151–59 and accompanying text. 
244 Walsh broke this into three separate variables: (1) whether the employer promptly investigated, 
(2) whether the employer took a strong corrective action, and (3) whether the harassment stopped. He 
found that prompt investigation was significant, but the other two were not. See Walsh, supra note 151, 
at 516–17 tbl.11. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 See supra notes 177–83 and accompanying text. 
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and employer corrective behavior, which would result in greater 
significance on those variables. 
Second, in our earlier article, we studied cases that arose shortly after 
Ellerth and Faragher.248 Both Walsh and our new study examined cases 
extending long after that period. This difference could account for the 
different variables we found significant, under the following narrative: In 
early cases, the law is less settled about what factors make an employer’s 
anti-harassment policy reasonable. As time goes on, there is an ever-
expanding database of court-tested anti-harassment policies, which 
sidelines the relatively straightforward question of “is a policy reasonable?” 
Lawyers can more easily weed out cases with bad policies (which is a 
document counsel can review and compare to ample case law) than those 
with bad corrective efforts or good employee behavior (both of which the 
lawyer must ascertain through internal investigations involving document 
review and client interviews and are subject to biases, credibility, memory, 
and document retention). It is further possible that as sexual harassment 
decisions have informed the best practices of employers, an increasing 
number of employers are able to institute legally sufficient written policies. 
It is much easier for employers to publish a written policy that is sufficient 
under the law than it is to respond appropriately to the infinite possible 
harassment reports, particularly given the number and degree of 
uncertainties governing whether the response is appropriate—the likelihood 
that the allegations amount to harassment; the strength of the evidence, 
including the credibility of the claimant, the harasser, and any witnesses; 
and the appropriate degree of punishment in relation to the allegations. 
Accordingly, unreasonable policies become increasingly harder to find in 
the cases. If this narrative is true, it would explain why policy is a 
significant predictor early in the Ellerth–Faragher jurisprudence but that 
significance ceded to other variables as time progressed.249 
VI. JUDICIAL RULE-BREAKING EXPLAINED 
In previous research, we found that employers prevailed in all cases in 
which the employer satisfied the Reasonable Employer Prong and the 
employee failed to report alleged harassment.250 The general consensus 
 
248 Sherwyn, Heise & Eigen, supra note 135, at 1275 (“Our data includes all published judicial 
opinions (N=72) for cases involving alleged sexual harassment in the workplace between June of 1998 
and January 2000 . . . .”). 
249 Walsh offers another possible explanation for why his results diverge from our earlier study. He 
suggests that perhaps multicollinearity still plagued our results even after correcting for it. See Walsh, 
supra note 151, at 518 n.256. He also questions our method for testing for multicollinearity. Id. But 
Walsh does not mention the substantive differences between his dataset and ours in the earlier study. 
250 Sherwyn, Heise & Eigen, supra note 135, at 1290. 
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among the courts was that employees’ fears of retaliation did not absolve 
them of their duty to complain.251 
In this study, the employer prevailed in 96% of the cases in which the 
employee failed to report but in 100% of the cases in which the employer 
satisfied the Reasonable Employer Prong and the employee failed to 
complain. In the case in which the employee failed to report but still 
prevailed, Davis v. Team Electric Co., the employer was woefully deficient 
in its efforts to prevent or correct harassment, and the conclusion that the 
employee failed to complain was questionable at best.252 The court noted 
that there was no evidence that the employer had an anti-harassment policy 
at all or that it afforded any way for aggrieved employees to avoid 
complaining to an allegedly harassing supervisor.253 Moreover, the 
employer performed no investigation and took no action against the 
harassing supervisors.254 The court concluded that the employee failed to 
complain because she only complained to the harassing supervisors.255 This 
fact did not, however, affect the court’s holding at all because, as the court 
stated, “[Defendant] has not shown that [Plaintiff] failed to take advantage 
of any preventive or corrective opportunities that it offered.”256 In other 
words, an employer’s behavior can be so bad that an employee’s “failure” 
to complain is not regarded as an unreasonable failure to avail oneself of 
preventive or corrective opportunities because, in effect, no such 
opportunities are available. Because the employer was so deficient, this 
case does not contradict what we found in our previous study257 and what 
the other twenty-four non-report cases in this study find: an employer who 
exercises reasonable care to prevent harassment will always prevail if the 
employee does not report alleged harassment. 
There were 106 cases in which employees did report. In our earlier 
study, employers prevailed in 84% of the cases in which employees 
reported. In the instant study, the employer prevailed in 85% of such cases. 
Both results fly in the face of Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion in which 
he stated: “[E]mployers will be liable notwithstanding the affirmative 
defense, even though they acted reasonably, so long as the plaintiff in 
question fulfilled her duty of reasonable care to avoid harm.”258 Justice 
Thomas’s contention is the logical extension of a faithful application of the 
rule. The question is: When does an employee fail to “fulfill[] [the] duty of 
 
251 Id. at 1291. 
252 520 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2008). 
253 Id. at 1097.  
254 Id.  
255 We coded this as failing to complain. See supra Part III.B.3. 
256 Davis, 520 F.3d at 1097. 
257 Sherwyn, Heise & Eigen, supra note 135, at 1290. 
258 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 773 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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reasonable care to avoid harm”?259 Not reporting constitutes such a failure 
when the employer exercises reasonable care to prevent harassment. 
We also observed seven cases in which employees failed to avoid 
harm by rejecting their employers’ accommodations. For example, in 
Brenneman v. Famous Dave’s of America, Inc., once the employee 
complained of harassment, the employer investigated the allegations and 
offered to transfer her to another store away from the allegedly offending 
supervisor.260 The court found the employee’s refusal of this offer and 
resignation to be unreasonable.261 Similarly, in Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield of Alabama, the plaintiff resigned when, after complaining about 
harassment, her employer offered to keep her in the same position but 
provide counseling between her and the alleged harasser.262 The court held 
that refusing this “first step” in conflict resolution was unreasonable.263 
Similarly, courts found resigning or refusing to return to work after 
employers disciplined or fired harassers unreasonable.264 In one case, the 
employee was determined to have behaved unreasonably when she reported 
alleged harassment to a supervisor but specifically asked the supervisor not 
to commence an investigation for fear of reprisal.265 In another nine cases, 
employees’ reporting suffered some defect (e.g., the complaint was 
vague).266 
A. Empirical Support for Judicial Rule-Breaking 
Our results have uncovered judicial rule-breaking in the Ellerth and 
Faragher context that we do not see in the Oncale context. This Section 
explores the ways in which judges have departed from the letter of Ellerth 
and Faragher. 
There were fifty-six cases in which employees reported alleged 
harassment to the correct persons, did not reject their employers’ 
accommodations, and suffered from no other defect limiting their claims. 
In all of these cases, the employers still prevailed. How can this be? In each 
 
259 See id. 
260 507 F.3d 1139, 1145 (8th Cir. 2007). 
261 Id.; see also Harmon v. Home Depot USA Inc., 130 F. App’x 902, 905 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding 
a plaintiff unreasonable where she quit when the employer was attempting to work out a transfer); 
Wallace v. San Joaquin County, 58 F. App’x 289, 291 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a plaintiff unreasonable 
where she refused to cooperate in the investigation and refused to pursue a transfer). 
262 480 F.3d 1287, 1305 (11th Cir. 2007). 
263 Id. 
264 Collette v. Stein-Mart, Inc., 126 F. App’x 678, 686 (6th Cir. 2005); Thompson v. Naphcare, 
Inc., 117 F. App’x 317, 324 (5th Cir. 2004). 
265 See Hardage v. CBS Broad. Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1188 (9th Cir. 2005). 
266 E.g., id.; Benefield v. Fulton Co., 130 F. App’x 308, 312 (11th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other 
grounds by Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2008); Episcopo v. Gen. Motors Corp., 128 F. 
App’x 519, 523 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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case the court held that the report was untimely, but none of the employees 
in these cases reported the alleged misconduct in an untimely way. Instead, 
in each of these cases the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent 
and correct harassment, and the court simply would not rule against an 
employer apparently doing what it could to prevent harassment. Thus, each 
court apparently felt compelled to find a way to construe the employee’s 
behavior as unreasonable. As shown in Table 4, courts looked to employer 
behavior to determine whether the employee’s behavior was reasonable, 
and as shown more specifically in Table 5, the court looked to employer 
behavior in determining whether the reports were timely. The problem is, 
as stated above and explained further below, such a ruling seems to 
blatantly defy the express mandate of the law. 
By too heavily relying on timeliness, courts have effectively 
eviscerated the Unreasonable Employee Prong for at least one subset of 
cases representing a relatively common fact pattern: pervasive harassment. 
One justification that courts cite for finding a delay unreasonable is that the 
victim could have prevented future instances of harassment had the 
employee reported it sooner. Courts have described this as a duty to stop 
harassment before it becomes “severe or pervasive.”267 But by placing this 
obligation on the victim,268 courts effectively eliminate the Unreasonable 
Employee Prong of the defense (at least with respect to harassment alleged 
to be pervasive, versus severe). 
A hypothetical illustrates this point. Assume that a manager harasses 
Employee A and Employee B with identical behavior. The harassment 
becomes pervasive at thirty days for both employees. The employer has 
taken reasonable efforts to prevent harassment. Employee A suffers the 
harassment for thirty-one days, at which time she files a formal report with 
the employer. The employer promptly investigates and fires the harasser, 
following up with training sessions to make sure Employee A suffers no 
retaliation. Assume these steps constitute reasonable efforts to correct the 
harassment. Employee B suffers the harassment for twenty-nine days, at 
which point she files a formal report with her employer. Similarly, the 
 
267 See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (“To the extent limiting 
employer liability could encourage employees to report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or 
pervasive, it would also serve Title VII’s deterrent purpose.”); Baldwin, 480 F.3d at 1307 (“The genius 
of the Faragher–Ellerth plan is that the corresponding duties it places on employers and employees are 
designed to stop sexual harassment before it reaches the severe or pervasive stage amounting to 
discrimination in violation of Title VII.”). 
268 Pinkerton v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1063–64 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Had 
[Defendant] been notified earlier, there is a good chance that Title VII’s primary goal of preventing 
harm would have been served.”); Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1290 (11th 
Cir. 2003) (“Had [Plaintiff] notified [Defendant’s] officials in June, when the harassment initially 
began, most of the incidents complained of could have been avoided.”). 
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employer promptly investigates, fires the harasser, and makes the same 
follow-up efforts. 
Our findings suggest that courts will likely conclude that Employee A 
waited too long to report the harassment, consider this time an 
unreasonable delay, and permit the employer to successfully advance its 
affirmative defense. As for Employee B, courts will be significantly less 
likely to reach the question of the affirmative defense, because the 
harassment is not yet pervasive, and therefore not actionable. Thus, in 
either case, an employee’s proper behavior can never subject an employer 
to liability, contrary to what the letter of the affirmative defense mandates. 
All that seems to matter in pervasive harassment cases is the employer’s 
behavior. 
This result probably stems from the perceived unfairness of the 
conjunctive nature of the two-pronged affirmative defense. In other words, 
if an employer acts reasonably to prevent and correct harassment, it may 
seem unfair to extend vicarious liability to that employer just because the 
employer was unlucky enough that the employee complained.269 Moreover, 
our findings lend continued support to our earlier argument that the 
affirmative defense perversely incentivizes employers not to make it too 
easy for employees to complain, lest they foreclose the possibility of 
satisfying the Unreasonable Employee Prong. Rather than incentivizing 
employers to do all they can to prevent harassment, the rule incentivizes 
only the bare minimum of preventative efforts, and nothing more. 
The majority of courts seem to have solved this problem by making 
new law: In contrast to the apparent intentions of the affirmative defense as 
set forth by the Supreme Court, employers that exercise reasonable care to 
prevent harassment and react well to a complaint will almost always prevail 
at summary judgment.270 To justify this, courts must declare the plaintiff 
untimely, and therefore unreasonable, regardless of whether the delay, if 
any, was reasonable and regardless of how much time it took to report. In 
fact, our earlier study included Moore v. Sam’s Club, a case in which the 
employer, according to the court, exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
correct harassment and the employee complained.271 The Moore court 
applied the rule technically and found for the employee.272 This was the 
 
269 One could also argue to the contrary on this point, perhaps because the employer hired the 
offending supervisor in the first place. 
270 See supra Table 4 (finding employer behavior variable significant in predicting whether the 
employee was unreasonable).  
271 55 F. Supp. 2d 177 (1999). 
272 Id. at 191–93 & n.14 (citing Justice Thomas’ dissent in Faragher and holding that “the 
Burlington/Faragher affirmative defense appears not to be applicable in this case because the facts 
presented on this motion do not support the second prong of that defense . . . [and in] the first prong of 
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only such case in the seventy-two cases in the study. There was no such 
case in the new study. Thus, in the 213 cases we studied, there was only 
one case where the courts applied the rule so that it yielded a result that all 
other cases avoided. A “good actor” employer who acted reasonably to 
prevent and correct harassment was found guilty because the employee 
complained. In every other case, such “good actor” employers were 
rewarded regardless of whether the employee reported or not. 
B. Why Judges Ignore Ellerth–Faragher & Follow Oncale 
In this Section, we assess why judges have followed Oncale but 
flouted the letter of Ellerth and Faragher. Absent any reason to believe that 
Congress or the Supreme Court will correct these rules, judges are left to 
consider breath and magnitude of their impact. We theorize that judges 
follow Oncale because they perceive the rule to impact a fairly narrow 
population of litigants, but the broadly applicable Ellerth–Faragher rule 
warrants greater judicial initiative to prevent injustice. 
Before distinguishing Ellerth and Faragher from Oncale, it is worth 
noting what the two cases and the rules that derive therefrom have in 
common—it is unlikely that any plea for a correction of either untenable 
rule will be met by the Supreme Court or Congress. The Court will not fix 
the problems associated with either rule, in large part because it so recently 
created them. As stated above, the Supreme Court codified sexual 
harassment in 1986 as a violation of Title VII.273 In 1993 the Court 
“clarified” the definition of hostile environment.274 In 1998 the Court 
decided Oncale, Ellerth, and Faragher. The Court left these rules largely 
untouched when it decided Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders275 in 2004 
and Vance v. Ball State University276 in 2013. Thus, there were four cases in 
the first twelve years following Meritor and two cases in the fifteen years 
since Ellerth and Faragher.277 There are two likely reasons for the dearth of 
 
the defense[] the evidence does show that [the employer] ‘exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior’”). 
273 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–69 (1986). 
274 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–23 (1993) (clarifying that complained of conduct 
need not result in psychological injury to the victim to rise to be actionable under Title VII; rather, 
courts must consider the “totality of the circumstances”).  
275 542 U.S. 129, 153 (2004) (holding that to establish a “constructive discharge,” an employee 
must show that the abusive working environment became so intolerable that any reasonable person 
would quit, but that the Ellerth–Faragher defense would be available unless the employee quits in 
response to an adverse action changing her employment status or situation, such as a demotion). 
276 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). 
277 Although there have been a number of cases since Ellerth and Faragher that have treated 
aspects of sexual harassment, none other than Suders and Vance have taken the opportunity to further 
clarify the definition of harassment or the standard for employer liability. See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y&H 
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006) (holding that the employee-numerosity requirement for Title VII was 
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cases since 1998. First, Oncale, Ellerth, and Faragher could be 
characterized as more legislative than adjudicative. All three cases 
promulgated rules. Oncale did not just hold that there was a cause of action 
for same-sex harassment, it set forth the rule on how to prove sexual 
harassment. Similarly, Ellerth and Faragher created a new affirmative 
defense that was not part of the case. This was a true act of judicial fiat. 
The Court is unlikely to revisit these issues without a prominent split in the 
circuits (which there is not as of the writing of this Article). The breadth of 
impact on the citizenry of Oncale is somewhat small (as described below). 
There is no political momentum surrounding either Oncale or Ellerth and 
Faragher, there is no evidence that the federal government views these as 
particularly high priority issues, and the justices have not indicated that this 
is an area of ideological interest.278 
There is no reason to believe that Congress will act, either. Despite the 
fact that sexual harassment is a cause of action created by the Court’s 
interpretation of Title VII, Congress did not even address it in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 changed the burden of 
proof in adverse impact cases (a tiny minority of cases279), codified the 
mixed motive framework for intentional discrimination cases, added jury 
trials, and established standards and limitations for punitive and 
compensatory damages.280 That Congress did not act on sexual harassment 
in 1991 was a clear signal to judges that there would be no legislative fix at 
that time. That was the perfect time to define hostile environment and 
employer liability, each of which was unclear and in flux. 
Thus, judges are faced with the question of whether to enforce or not 
enforce these rules. Judges have followed the rule handed down in Oncale, 
but have not been so true to Ellerth and Faragher. Why? And, just as 
importantly, what can we learn from these outcomes? We learn from 
Oncale, Ellerth, and Faragher that in deciding when to follow a rule, 
 
nonjurisdictional and therefore could be conceded where not challenged before trial); Jones v. R.R. 
Donnelly & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 377–83 (2004) (treating the statute of limitations applicable to 
various types of discrimination claims); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 119–20 
(2002) (holding that for claims alleging discrete acts of discrimination, plaintiff must file an EEOC 
charge within 180 or 300 days of the discrete act, but a hostile environment claim will not be time 
barred if all acts constituting the claim are part of the same unlawful practice and one of the acts 
occurred within the 180- or 300-day filing period); Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 
843, 848 (2001) (holding front pay is not an element of compensatory damages for sexual harassment 
claims); Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 529–30 (1999) (treating the standard for proving 
punitive damages for Title VII claims). 
278 See Emily Grant et al., The Ideological Divide: Conflict and the Supreme Court’s Certiorari 
Decision, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 559, 568–69 (2012). 
279 See Creola Johnson, Credentialism and the Proliferation of Fake Degrees: The Employer 
Pretends to Need a Degree; The Employee Pretends to Have One, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 269, 
316–17 (2006). 
280 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
168 
judges, knowing that there is no reasonable probability of a forthcoming 
legislative or judicial fix, will consider the frequency of cases and the 
relative harm to litigants and society caused by strict application of the 
rules. 
With regard to Oncale’s equal-opportunity harasser defense, the 
frequency multiplied by the harm is not worth the costs judges incur by 
ignoring or misapplying the rule. Dutifully applied, Oncale allows bisexual 
managers to demand sex from, or to create a hostile environment for, both 
men and women.281 Only seventy-three federal court opinions since Oncale 
use the phrase “equal opportunity harasser” (or some derivative thereof),282 
demonstrating the small number of cases in which this defense comes up. 
In addition, a recent survey found that 1.8% of adult Americans identify as 
bisexual.283 The number of bisexuals who are (1) managers, (2) working for 
employers fitting Title VII’s definition of employer,284 (3) open in their 
sexual preferences, and (4) willing to engage in reprehensible conduct is 
likely a small subset of that 1.8%. 
Of course, heterosexuals and homosexuals may also harass both men 
and women in order to avoid liability. But, the number of pretend 
equal-opportunity harassers is likely very small. Heterosexuals or 
homosexuals who have a desire to harass the gender they are interested in 
would need to know that the equal-opportunity harasser is a viable defense 
and would need to be willing to harass the gender they are not interested in 
(incurring the risks associated therewith). They would also need to be 
willing to suffer the consequences from an employer who, despite being 
absolved of liability, might not respond positively to a manager sexually 
harassing subordinates, and may incur substantial legal fees. 
 
281 See supra Part II.A–B. 
282 We searched for the phrase “equal-opportunity-harass!” across the “All Federal” case database 
on WestlawNext and limited the results to cases decided after March 4, 2008. We ran this search most 
recently on May 25, 2014 and received seventy-three hits. This result is likely underinclusive because a 
court need not use the phrase “equal opportunity harasser” to describe the defense, and the result is also 
overinclusive because some number of the seventy-three cases were false hits. But it is still useful as a 
rough indication of how rare these cases are. 
283 GARY J. GATES, HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER? 1 
(2011), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-How-Many-People-
LGBT-Apr-2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/M2FB-BER3]. 
284 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) (“[A] person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 
fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the 
current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person, but such term does not include 
(1) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian 
tribe, or any department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the 
competitive service (as defined in section 2102 of title 5), or (2) a bona fide private membership club 
(other than a labor organization) which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of title 26, except 
that during the first year after March 24, 1972, persons having fewer than twenty-five employees (and 
their agents) shall not be considered employers.”). 
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Moreover, there is always a risk that the defense will not work. For 
instance, try as they may, the pretenders may not harass the sex in which 
they are not truly interested to the same degree as that of the other sex, and 
thus, may not satisfy the severe or pervasive standard. In other words, this 
defense will affect very few people. Moreover, while the consequences to 
the plaintiffs affected by the defense are harsh—they lose their case—it 
will not really affect society as a whole. 
In contrast, Ellerth and Faragher cases are commonplace. Indeed, 
there were seventy-two summary judgment motions filed on the rule in its 
first eighteen months.285 A WestlawNext search using the terms “sexual 
harassment,” Ellerth, and “affirmative defense” (or derivatives thereof) 
yielded 2360 cases.286 Every circuit has analyzed the defense. The cases, 
however, do not tell the whole story. Every employer with at least fifteen 
employees is subject to the rule, and thus, every employer who seeks to 
comply with the rule will gather information from some source (legal 
counsel, human resources professionals, written materials, webinars, 
etc.).287 In stark contrast to Oncale, dutifully following the rule carries a 
high probability of disastrous results for a very large target pool. If 
employees prevail whenever they complain, the message to employers will 
be: exercise reasonable care to prevent harassment, but not too much. In 
practical terms, it disincentivizes employers from doing anything more than 
establishing a strong, written antiharassment policy with more than one 
avenue to report harassment (i.e., the baseline that courts routinely find 
constitutes “reasonable efforts” to prevent harassment288). As a corollary, 
we see little reason under the law for any employer to continue to provide 
harassment identification training, 1-800 harassment reporting hotlines, and 
other mechanisms that increase the likelihood that harassment will be 
properly identified and timely reported. Employees who complain of 
 
285 Sherwyn, Heise & Eigen, supra note 135, at 1275. 
286 On May 26, 2014, we ran a search in the “All Federal” case database on WestlawNext using the 
following syntax:  
((sex! gender) /1 haras!) & (ellerth faragher “118 s.ct. 2257” “524 u.s. 742” “118 s.ct. 2275” “524 
u.s. 775”) & affirmative-defense 
287 Employment law firms routinely distribute memoranda to clients updating them on new cases 
and their impact on day-to-day operations. For instance, a large national employer-side employment law 
firm, Seyfarth Shaw, released a memorandum to clients advising them of the new definition of 
“supervisor” when applying the Ellerth–Farragher affirmative defense following the Vance v. Ball St. 
University ruling. Camille Olson et al., The U.S. Supreme Court to Revisit the Scope of the 
Faragher/Ellerth Supervisor Liability Rule, SEYFARTH SHAW (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.seyfarth.com/
uploads/siteFiles/publications/TheU.S.SupremeCourtToRevisitTheScopeOfTheFaragherEllerthSupervis
orLiabilityRule.pdf [http://perma.cc/3KLN-3C8K]. 
288 E.g., Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2010); Thompson v. 
Naphcare, Inc., 117 F. App’x 317, 324 (5th Cir. 2004); Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 245 (2d 
Cir. 2001); Wright v. Anixter, Inc., No. 98-17164, 1999 WL 638714, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 1999) 
(unpublished table decision). 
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harassment that violates the law will prevail. Thus, employers investigating 
complaints of harassment have countervailing incentives: acknowledging 
harassment occurred amounts to a party admission as to whether 
harassment occurred, but at the same time, performing an investigation in 
bad faith poses a risk to the employer’s ability to establish the Reasonable 
Employer Prong. 
Considering the disparate outcomes our model predicts, it makes sense 
for judges to follow the Oncale rule and ignore Ellerth and Faragher. 
Aside from the important phenomenological reasons for highlighting these 
differences, given the large volume of sexual harassment claims, and the 
even larger volume of employers affected by the rules and their application 
or lack thereof, this example presents a cautionary tale for judges faced 
with the opportunity to make rules. Judges ought to consider the degree to 
which rules will create the problem described in this Article for lower court 
judges charged with their application. All else equal, judges should weigh 
the probability of contemplated harm caused by application of the rule 
times the affected pool of individuals or entities to which the rule’s 
potential harm would extend. If the probability times the affected pool of 
individuals or entities is large, judges may be better advised to advance a 
standard, allowing augmented judicial discretion.289 All else equal, rules are 
more likely to be applied (assuming that is the goal), even when application 
will have harmful results, when the target population of the rule’s 
application is small, and the probability of the harm is relatively low. While 
it may be tempting to embrace rules over standards because of 
predictability, predictability is an illusion in the case of the Ellerth–
Faragher defense given the extent to which judges distort the application 
of the rule. 
CONCLUSION 
Our theory will be tested in the next few years because of the Supreme 
Court’s Vance decision. Like the affirmative defense and the equal-
opportunity harasser cases, the rule set forth in Vance yields an untenable 
result if applied properly290—the employee who oversees day-to-day 
operations, has the power to assign work, has the power to make 
employees’ working conditions pleasant or miserable, and can effectively 
 
289 Frank Cross et al., A Positive Political Theory of Rules and Standards, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 
23–26 (discussing the choice between rules and standards). 
290 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443 (2013) (holding, in applying its standard for 
liability for harassment by a supervisor, that an employer may be vicariously liable for a supervisor’s 
unlawful harassment only when the “employer has empowered that [supervisor] to take tangible 
employment actions against the victim, i.e., to effect a ‘significant change in employment status, such 
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a 
decision causing a significant change in benefits’”). 
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recommend terminations, will no longer be considered a “supervisor” 
because decisions regarding “tangible” changes ultimately rest with the 
human resource department. To counteract this unjust result, we predict 
that lower courts will expand the term “tangible action” to render Vance 
meaningless. It is difficult to overstate the importance of this case for 
employment law. Employer liability for every sexual harassment case rests 
on whether the harasser was a supervisor,291 and limiting that definition 
could undermine the law. As our study demonstrates, lower courts have 
already effectively rewritten Ellerth and Faragher so that employees who 
do not suffer a tangible loss will recover only if the employer did not 
exercise reasonable care to prevent harassment, or if reported, the employer 
did not respond well.292 We predict that courts will thus follow a de facto 
“negligence” standard in all non-tangible loss cases. Thus, all but the most 
obvious supervisors will now be deemed coworkers in order to perpetuate 
the de facto lower-court-created vicarious liability standard. 
Analyzing judicial rule-breaking behavior in common civil cases like 
those discussed in this Article contributes to our understanding of judicial 
behavior more broadly because we are able to study behavior in a context 
stripped of the normative and political settings in which rule-breaking is 
more often described and studied. Absent the strong political or social 
forces that might influence a judge to conform her behavior to expectations 
when she feels that she is being watched more closely, this Article begins 
to shed light on rule-breaking by judges. This Article presents findings 
about one area of law and one set of rules. Additional research is surely 
necessary to compare across other areas of law and other untenable rules, 
but this Article lays a solid foundation to advance our understanding of 
rule-breaking under quotidian adjudicative circumstances. 
  
 
291 Id. at 2439 (“If the harassing employee is the victim’s co-worker, the employer is liable only if 
it was negligent in controlling working conditions. In cases in which the harasser is a ‘supervisor,’ 
however, different rules apply. If the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment 
action, the employer is strictly liable. But if no tangible employment action is taken, the employer may 
escape liability by establishing, as an affirmative defense, that (1) the employer exercised reasonable 
care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities that the employer provided.”). 
292 See supra Part V. 
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